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Abstract 
 
Network resiliency pertains to the vulnerability of telecommunication networks in the case of 
failures and malicious attacks. With the increasing capacity catering of network for the 
booming multi-services in Next Generation Networks (NGNs), reducing recovery time and 
improving capacity efficiency while providing high quality and resiliency of services has 
become increasingly important for the future network development. Providing network 
resiliency means to rapidly and accurately reroute the traffic via diversely routed spare 
capacity in the network when a failure takes down links or nodes in the working path. 
Planning and optimization for NGNs require an efficient algorithm for spare capacity 
allocation (SCA) that assures restorability with a minimum of total capacity. This 
dissertation aims to understand and advance the state of knowledge on spare capacity 
allocation in network resiliency for telecommunication core networks. 
        Optimal network resiliency design for restorability requires considering: network 
topology, working and protection paths routing and spare capacity allocation. Restorable 
networks should be highly efficient in terms of total capacity required for restorability and be 
able to support any target level of restorability. The SCA strategy is to decide how much 
spare capacity should be reserved on links and to pre-plan protection paths to protect traffic 
from a set of failures. This optimal capacity allocation problem for survivable routing is 
known as NP-complete. To expose the problem structure, we propose a model of the SCA 
problem using a matrix-based framework, named Distributed Resilience Matrix (DRM) to 
identify the dependencies between the working and protection capacities associated with 
each pair of links and also to capture the local capacity usage information in a distributed 
control environment. In addition, we introduce a novel ant-based heuristic algorithm, called 
Friend-or-Foe Resilient (FoF-R) ant-based routing algorithm to find the optimal protection 
cycle (i.e., two node-disjoint paths between a source-destination node pair) and explore the 
sharing ability among protection paths using a capacity headroom-dependent attraction and 
repulsion function. Simulation results based on the OMNeT++ and AMPL/CPLEX tools 
show that the FoF-R scheme with the DRM structure is a promising approach to solving the 
SCA problem for survivable routing and it gives a good trade off between solution optimality 
and computation speed.  
x 
        Furthermore, for the SCA studies of survivable networks, it is also important to be able 
to differentiate between network topologies by means of a robust numerical measure that 
indicates the level of immunity of these topologies to failures of their nodes and links. 
Ideally, such a measure should be sensitive to the existence of nodes or links, which are more 
important than others, for example, if their failure causes the network’s disintegration. 
Another contribution in this dissertation is to introduce an algebraic connectivity metric, 
adopted from the spectral graph theory, namely the 2nd smallest eigenvalue of the Laplacian 
matrix of the network topology, instead of the average nodal degree, to characterize network 
robustness in studies of the SCA problem. Extensive simulation studies confirm that this 
metric is a more informative parameter than the average nodal degree for characterizing 
network topologies in network resiliency studies.             
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1
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
Due to the increasing social dependency on telecommunication network facilities in the 
ongoing “information era”, network resiliency has become a very critical research area. 
Network resiliency gauges the ability of the network to support the committed Quality of 
Services (QoS) to customers continuously, even in the presence of various failures. Network 
resilience mechanisms include a set of methods to pre-plan and utilize the network’s spare 
resources to guarantee seamless communications upon failure. Failures include fiber cuts, 
because of construction work, natural disasters, human errors or hardware and software 
breakdown as described e.g., in [1-3]. Most of these failures are hard to forecast and 
eliminate, but it is possible to mitigate the impact of a set of specific failure scenarios by 
introducing network resilience techniques into the network design phase.  
Traditional network resilience mechanism includes two main aspects: survivable routing 
and spare capacity allocation (SCA). These two phases are complementary to each other and 
cooperate to achieve seamless communication service operation upon failure [4]. Survivable 
routing refers to the incorporation of a diverse routing mechanism into the network design 
phase, so as to reroute the traffic upon a set of given failure scenarios. The SCA is a major 
component in dimensioning a survivable network when the network topology is given. It 
ensures enough spare capacity for the physical network or the virtual network to recover 
from a failure via traffic rerouting. An optimal SCA design procedure requires the efficient 
capacity allocation both on working and protection paths. It ensures that the working paths 
are routed over relatively short routes as well as efficiently restorable by the protection paths. 
It targets the achievement of maximal sharing among the redundant resources in the network.  
2 
This dissertation focuses on the SCA problem for survivable routing. An in-depth 
description of the SCA is provided and its Integer Linear Programming (ILP) model is 
presented. We focus on tackling the SCA problem by an ant-based heuristic routing 
algorithm and also on investigating a topological metric to quantify the network robustness 
characteristic. Our novel solutions such as the Distributed Resilience Matrix (DRM), Friend-
or-Foe Resilient (FoF-R) ant-based routing algorithm and the utility of an algebraic 
connectivity metric in SCA have been developed and verified by extensive simulation 
results. We believe they are three valuable contributions to the research area of network 
resiliency.  
1.1 Background  
Modern telecommunication networks are equipped with ultra-high speed switches to meet 
the dynamically changing traffic demands. In backbone networks, connection requests are 
launched dynamically from the upper layers, for which routing algorithms are used to derive 
the corresponding capacity guaranteed tunnels that meet all the QoS requirements [5]. 
Offering a reliable communication platform with strong traffic engineering mechanisms and 
QoS guarantee leads the carrier and its customers to a revenue-generating environment. The 
long-term telecommunication survivors will be those who can find the balance between 
technological innovation, improved customer services, and efficient allocation of network 
resources. Therefore, network resiliency is becoming one of the most important QoS issues, 
and shared path protection scheme is recognized as one of the best strategies to equip the 
network with service resiliency by pre-planning path protection [6-9]. With a disjoint 
working-protection path pair, once the working path fails unexpectedly, its working traffic 
can be switched to the protection path and thus the corresponding services can be restored.  
        In recent years, we have seen great progress in network resilience technologies that 
enable telecommunication systems to continue operating without disruption, despite the 
inevitable failure events. Key network resilience protocols have been studied for at least the 
last two decades, and every year, the world’s telecommunications journals and conferences 
are filled with new efforts in this area. The research results presented in this dissertation aim 
to contribute to that body of knowledge by offering new network resilience techniques and 
solutions to solve the SCA problem for survivable routing. In addition, a more informative 
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topological metric i.e., algebraic connectivity is introduced to measure the network 
robustness with comparison to the popular average nodal degree metric.  
1.2 Motivation  
Despite the extensive prior research on network resiliency, the current approaches still have 
shortcomings due to the complex nature of SCA for survivable routing. Among different 
mechanisms for SCA, the weakness of the fixed-routing approach is the need for keeping up-
to-date with the rapidly changing network state. Therefore, the performance of the fixed-
routing based SCA technique is unacceptable in practice. On the other hand, the existing 
adaptive SCA algorithms that can provide optimal or near optimal routing solutions, require 
centralized and global routing information. This requirement has two problems:  
• The communication networks must be equipped with a very complex network 
control layer which co-exists above the physical layer to continuously broadcast the 
link-state information toward every network node. This kind of centralized and 
global approach has fault-tolerance and scalability problems;  
• The maintaining of such global routing information, either centralized at a command 
and control node or distributed among network nodes, may lead to an inaccurate 
routing information condition that can terribly degrade network performance when 
adaptive SCA algorithms determine a routing solution based on this inaccurate 
information [10-11]. 
In order to overcome the above disadvantages, a new approach for building a fully 
distributed SCA algorithm is needed. It must be efficient in terms of capacity usage and also 
be applicable to practical networks. Aiming at this target, we propose a novel Distributed 
Resilience Matrix (DRM) as a possible solution, which is inspired by the Spare Provision 
Matrix (SPM) structure [12]. In addition, there have been numerous publications on network 
routing with swarm intelligence since the first milestone paper, [13], in this area, but the ant-
based routing algorithm e.g., in [14] for data communication networks can not be applied 
directly into the area of network resiliency. It is also notable that no results are available for 
applying the ant-based approach to solve the SCA problem. These observations motivate us 
to extend this promising heuristic mechanism on a new direction to solve the SCA problem 
and also to use the mobile agents to implement the updating of capacity usage information in 
the DRM structure. 
4 
        Additionally, in our simulation studies of FoF-R routing algorithm with the DRM 
structure, the experimental results reveal that the average nodal degree metric, which we 
used to measure network connectivity, fails to adequately capture the network robustness 
characteristic in SCA. This finding motivates us to work on the network topology aspect to 
explore a more informative topological metric to measure network robustness. By 
introducing the algebraic connectivity metric, i.e., the second smallest eigenvalue of the 
Laplacian matrix of the network graph, our numerical results show that this metric is more 
accurate and informative than the average nodal degree metric. 
1.3 Contributions  
This dissertation focuses on investigating the SCA problem for survivable routing. Our first 
contribution is a novel Distributed Resilience Matrix (DRM) framework, which is used to 
model the dependence between the working and spare capacities. This additional relationship 
information is critical to explore the sharing potential among protection paths in SCA 
problem.  
The second contribution is the Friend-or-Foe Resilient ant-based routing algorithm. It is 
noted that the ant-based routing algorithms developed so far by other researchers in the 
communication area have concentrated on the coordination behaviour between ant agents. 
We postulate that network resiliency can benefit from augmenting ants’ competitive 
behaviour with detestation behaviour between agents. This enrichment enables the ant agents 
to find disjoint routes from working paths, as alternative good quality paths to reroute the 
traffic upon failure and also to explore the capacity sharing potentials among their protection 
paths. Therefore, we have introduced both cooperation and detestation behaviors to the ants, 
adopting a “Friend or Foe” philosophy by using a capacity headroom-dependent attraction 
and repulsion function. The artificial ant is thus armed with ability for identifying who has 
already deposited the pheromones on the routes, whether it is a Friend or Foe. Then, an ant 
agent can make movements and deposit pheromones with different strategies. Through 
extensive simulations, we show that the FoF-R ant-based mobile agent approach can solve 
the SCA problem in survivable routing. It can reduce the connection setup delay for recovery 
and improve significantly the network performance in comparison with other algorithms.  
Furthermore, in studies of network resiliency, it is important to be able to differentiate 
network topologies by means of a robust numerical measure that would indicate the levels of 
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immunity of these topologies to failures of their nodes and links. Ideally, such a measure 
should be sensitive to the existence of nodes or links which are more important than others, 
for example, if their failures cause the network’s disintegration. Our third contribution is to 
introduce an algebraic connectivity metric to quantify the network robustness other than the 
average nodal degree metric, which is currently popular within the research community. The 
concept of algebraic connectivity is adopted from the spectral graph theory, and is the 2nd 
smallest eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix of a given network. Extensive simulation studies 
confirm that this metric is more informative and accurate than the average nodal degree for 
characterizing the network topologies in studies of network resiliency.      
1.4 Thesis Outline 
The objective of this dissertation is to study the SCA problem for survivable 
telecommunication networks. It focuses on backbone networks in a single link or node 
failure scenario. The main task is to establish connections in the network such that there is an 
efficient SCA strategy to survive existing traffic flows upon any single failure in the network.         
 
Figure 1.1 Thesis outline 
6 
        This dissertation’s structure is depicted in Figure 1.1. The remainder of this dissertation 
contains an introduction of relevant background knowledge, followed by benchmarking 
studies, and comprehensive analyses and discussion of three key advances in the area of 
network resiliency. 
 
Chapter 2 gives an introduction to network resiliency and reviews the current network 
resilience techniques and protection categories. The spare capacity allocation (SCA) problem 
is described and the related ILP models corresponding to the benchmarking SCA 
mechanisms such as Shared Backup Path Protection (SBPP) and p-cycles are described and 
discussed. 
 
Chapter 3 introduces background knowledge on capacity sharing. Then the existing Spare 
Provision Matrix (SPM) is described and the new matrix-based framework, named 
Distributed Resilience Matrix (DRM), is proposed to capture the dependence between the 
working and spare capacities in a distributed manner. This additional information is critical 
for exploring the capacity sharing potential among protection paths. 
 
Chapter 4 presents a novel ant-based routing algorithm, called the Friend-or-Foe Resilient 
(FoF-R) ant-based routing algorithm, to implement the distributed signaling for updating and 
exchanging the capacity usage information in DRMs framework. In addition, the FoF-R 
survivable routing algorithm can find the optimal protection cycle (i.e., two node-disjoint 
paths between a source-destination node pair) and explore the sharing ability among 
protection paths using a capacity headroom-dependent attraction and repulsion function. 
Simulation results based on the OMNeT++ tool show that the FoF-R scheme with the DRM 
structure is a promising approach to solve SCA problem for survivable routing and it gives a 
good tradeoff between solution optimality and computation speed.  
 
Chapter 5 develops deeper into network topology research related to network resiliency. It 
focuses on introducing a new topological metric i.e., algebraic connectivity to quantify the 
network robustness and also to find its correlation to the SCA. Instead of using the popular 
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average nodal degree metric to quantify the network robustness, we introduce a more 
informative metric i.e., algebraic connectivity, which is the second smallest eigenvalue of 
Laplacian matrix of a given network. We perform a thorough comparison of topologies to 
validate the new metric and extensive results presented reveal that the average nodal degree 
metric fails to capture the details of network robustness characteristic, whereas using 
algebraic connectivity metric, the network robustness properties can be better characterized.  
 
Chapter 6 summarizes the main contributions of this dissertation as well as explains the 
limitations of the research work presented. We also suggest some possible directions for 
future research such as extending the FoF-R routing algorithm’s capability to handle 
arbitrary failure scenarios.    
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Chapter 2 
Spare Capacity Allocation for 
Survivable Routing   
 
In this chapter, we briefly discuss the fundamentals of network resiliency and then describe 
the spare capacity allocation (SCA) problem for survivable routing. Designing a low cost and 
survivable telecommunication network is an extremely complicated process and there is a 
growing consensus that mathematical programming belongs in the network designer’s 
toolkit. The mathematical modeling coupled with optimization solvers has greatly reduced 
the burden of implementation of mathematical programming theory into the practice of 
network design. For benchmarking our proposed algorithm, we first present some Integer 
Linear Programming (ILP) models developed for solving the SCA problem. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. First, we give some background 
knowledge on network resiliency and then the classification of protection schemes is 
introduced. The mathematical modeling for the SCA problem is presented and the ILP 
models for link protection, shared backup path protection (SBPP) and p-Cycles schemes are 
developed. Finally, critical information on the dependence between working and spare 
capacity in SCA for survivable routing is described. 
2.1 Background on Network Resiliency 
Network resiliency is the ability of the network to provide and maintain an acceptable level 
of service in the case of various failures of normal operation. It reflects the ability of a 
network to continue to function during and after failures. The following are key aspects of 
network resiliency that we need to consider in our studies.  
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2.1.1 Restoration and Protection  
Throughout the preceding discussions on the SCA problem, we have used the terms 
restoration and protection to refer to various network resilience mechanisms and actions 
interchangeably. However, in general, the term “protection” is used for schemes where the 
switching actions required after failure are pre-defined and spare capacity is often dedicated 
[15] to cover a specific set of failure scenarios. In a pure protection mechanism, even cross-
connection is unnecessary when the signal is switched to the protection path; the protection 
paths are pre-configured into a pre-tested and ready-to-use state. However, the term 
protection is also used to refer to schemes such as Shared Backup Path Protection (SBPP) 
where the protection route is known ahead of time, but the capacity allocation and cross-
connection remain to be accomplished in real time after failure has occurred.  
Restoration, on the other hand, generally refers to the mechanisms where backup paths 
do not need to be pre-defined and a network-wide allocation of spare capacity is not 
dedicated to any specific failure but it is configured as needed to restore affected carrier 
signals after a failure has occurred [16]. In their purest form, restoration mechanisms 
determine backup paths, allocate spare capacity, and form the appropriate cross-connections 
all in real time as a response to a failure, either through a centralized mechanism or a 
distributed protocol. However, depending on the specific implementation, some restoration 
mechanisms can carry out pre-planning operations, and even some amount of pre-
configuration is possible. Restoration by its very nature is adaptive to unexpected changes in 
the network state, and as such, will typically exhibit better availability than protection 
mechanisms.  
2.1.2 Centralized vs. Distributed Protection 
According to the decision making and availability of information, we can divide protection 
schemes into two main categories: centralized and distributed. Centralized protection 
schemes use a centralized management system to perform the protection functions, such as 
failure detection, selection of backup route and redirection of flows to the established 
alternative path. A centralized scheme has the advantage of always getting all network 
information available, including topology and link capacity availability, even during failure, 
so it is capable of finding an optimal configuration such as minimizing the total amount of 
capacity allocated. However, a centralized approach requires the central database to be 
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continually updated, and there exists a single-point of failure of the central 
collection/management point. In addition, the recovery speed is relatively slow with the 
centralized scheme due to the communication delay between the centralized controller and 
other nodes, and the concentration of processing load on the centralized controller. 
To alleviate the negative impact of the centralized control for protection, some 
proposals [17-18] consider distributed protection control. In a distributed protection scheme, 
each node in the network is capable of handling failures and making re-routing decisions. 
The distributed protection is more robust because it does not need a global view of the 
network state and thus is not vulnerable to a single point of failure, but it will not necessarily 
find an optimal configuration after a failure. Also, many network operators are ware of 
trusting their networks to such a distributed self-organizing process. 
2.1.3 Link vs. Path Protection 
We can further categorize protection mechanism by differentiating between localized and 
end-to-end path protection [19]. Localized protection is when backup paths are established 
between the end nodes of the failure link, whereas end-to-end schemes restore affected 
demands by constructing backup paths between their individual source and destination nodes. 
The backup paths should be completely disjoint from the pre-failure working paths. End-to-
end protection schemes are typically able to make more efficient use of network resources, 
and so it tends to require less spare capacity than localized protection schemes.  
 
Figure 2.1 Link protection vs. Path protection 
As shown in Figure 2.1, the most common form of localized protection is link 
protection, where a centralized or self-organizing re-routing mechanism deploys a 
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collectively coordinated set of backup paths between the end nodes of the failed link and 
effectively avoids the failure. Spare capacity is allocated at the time that the failure happens 
only, and will otherwise remain available for use as required to route protection paths for any 
failure scenario or carrying preemptible unprotected traffic. For working capacity on the 
failed link, one protection path must be established between the end nodes of the failed link, 
and so long as spare capacity is available to accommodate them. Link protection thus 
provides a logical detour comprised of a set of backup path segments around the break that 
disrupts working paths, without the consideration for the ultimate source-destination nodes 
of each working path being restored.  
        In path protection, the reaction to a failure takes place from an end-to-end viewpoint for 
each service path affected by the failure. Path protection schemes have several advantages. 
One is that they are more amenable to customer level control and visibility. Link protection 
is rather inherently a function of the transport network itself, whereas path level protection 
can be a function that is put in the users’ control, or under the control of a service layer node 
such as a router. For example, in SBPP scheme, it is also possible for the users to know 
ahead of time, and even control, exactly where their service will be rerouted upon a failure. 
This is sometimes said to be important to customers. In addition, path protection spreads the 
overall rerouting problem more widely over the whole network and it is usually more 
capacity efficient than link protection, although the difference depend on network topology. 
In addition, path oriented protection schemes only require fault detection at the end nodes of 
the path, and this can be attractive for transparent or translucent optical networks where 
signal monitoring may not be available at intermediate nodes. On the other hand, path 
protection schemes are generally not as fast as their link oriented counterpart due the greater 
distances and numbers of nodes involved in recovery procedure signaling. Availability issues 
can also arise when working and protection paths are both long. 
2.1.4 Protection Techniques 
All types of network resilience techniques involve network spare resources allocation to the 
rerouting mechanisms. Based on the availability of network resources [20], protection 
mechanisms can be classified into the following four major types:  
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• 1+1 Protection: A dedicated backup path is predefined and the traffic is sent over 
both working and backup paths simultaneously. The receiver has some local 
algorithms to choose the best signal;  
• 1:1 Protection: A dedicated backup path is predefined, the traffic is rerouted to the 
backup path only after the failure has occurred;   
• 1:N Protection: A dedicated backup path is predefined to protect a number of N 
working paths. The traffic will be switched to the backup path, if any of the working 
paths fail, but after that,  the remaining N–1 paths are unprotected;  
• M:N protection: The number of M dedicated backup paths are predefined to protect 
N ≥ 1  working paths, where [1, ]M N∈ .  
The dedicated 1+1 protection is the fastest, as the traffic is being simultaneously 
transmitted over working and protection paths. However, compared to an unprotected 
system, it requires twice the amount of network resources, i.e., 100% redundancy. This 
technique has been widely used in Automatic Protection Switching (APC) of premium or 
high availability services. It should be noted that both 1:1 and 1: N protections are actually 
special cases of M: N protection technique. In M: N protection, the M backup paths are used 
to protect the N working paths. This provides a better utilization of resources than 1+1 
protection, since backup paths are used by multiple working paths. Also, the idle backup 
resources can be used by low priority traffic to enhance further network resource utilization. 
However, this improved resource utilization in M: N is obtained at the cost of additional 
signaling and increased protection switching time, which will increase the overall recovery 
time of the network against faults.  
2.1.5 Shared Risk Link Groups  
Most of the previous protection mechanisms are designed for protection against failure of an 
individual or a diverse set of links, which may also have failure correlation to other 
components in a network. There exists a much broader concept known as Shared Risk Link 
Groups (SRLGs) for the design of survivable networks. An SRLG is a group of network 
links that share a common physical resource e.g., cable, conduit or node, whose failure will 
cause the failure of all links of the group. Thus, all links in the SRLGs have a shared risk of 
failure. SRLGs have been proposed as a fundamental concept for failure management in the 
Generalized Multi-Protocol Label Switching (GMPLS) control plane. In general, the 
information on SRLGs is obtained manually by the network operator with the knowledge of 
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the physical fiber plant of the network. This dissertation is limited to focus on single link or 
node protection and it does not include the consideration for the network protection with 
SRLGs. Extension of protection schemes involving SRLGs is discussed in [21], see also 
references there. 
2.1.6 P-cycle 
The concept of Preconfigured Protection Cycle (p-cycle) was introduced by Grover in [22-
23]. P-cycles can be characterized as preconfigured protection cycles in a mesh network and 
it combines the speed of ring networks with the capacity efficiency of mesh networks [24-
25]. P-cycles are ring-like pre-configured structures of spare capacity used to protect against 
failure of on-cycle links i.e., those links that are a part of the p-cycle, and straddling links 
i.e., those links whose end nodes are both on the p-cycle, but which are not actually a part of 
the p-cycle itself. Upon failure of a protected link, the p-cycle is “broken into” by the 
protection mechanism to re-route the traffic around the failure. The fundamental difference 
between p-cycles and rings, and the cause of p-cycles’ increased efficiency, is in the 
protection of straddling link failures. A unit-sized ring can only protect against the failure of 
a single wavelength on each link on the ring itself, but a unit-sized p-cycle can protect the 
failure of a wavelength on each on-cycle link as well as two wavelengths on each straddling 
link, for the same amount of spare capacity. The reason of a p-cycle can protect two units of 
working capacity on each straddling link is because: if the straddling link fails, one unit can 
be restored in the clockwise direction around the cycle, and the other can be restored in the 
counter-clockwise direction. 
 
Figure 2.2 An example of p-cycle protection  
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        An example of p-cycle protection in a network with 6 nodes is illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
The p-cycle is as shown in Figure 2.2(a). For failure of an on-cycle link in Figure 2.2(b), the 
working capacity on the failed link is re-routed around the p-cycle. For failure of a straddling 
link in Figure 2.2(c), the working capacity on the failed link can be re-routed in either 
direction around the p-cycle. If there are two units of working capacity on the failed 
straddling link, then one unit can be restored in each direction. 
        While it is not quite as capacity efficient as other mesh protection schemes e.g., link 
protection and SBPP, the p-cycles provides the same very rapid protection as rings because 
they are pre-connected prior to failure. P-cycles are significantly more efficient than rings 
because of their ability to protect straddling links. A simple comparison of a ring and a p-
cycle will easily demonstrate how important the protection of straddling links is to p-cycle 
efficiency. P-cycles have another key benefit over rings, in that working paths can be shortest 
path routed through the network; they are not constrained by the p-cycle systems used to 
protect them. In a ring network, on the other hand, working path routing must follow the ring 
structures and inter-ring transitions. In fact, working paths on a straddling link do not even 
need to be routed within any p-cycle at all to be protected as long as each link crossed is a 
straddling link. Because of the advantages associated with p-cycle protection, we use it as 
one of benchmarking SCA mechanisms to our proposed algorithm. In addition, we use 
Shared Backup Path Protection (SBPP) as another benchmarking SCA mechanism, which is 
introduced in the following section. 
2.1.7 Shared Backup Path Protection 
The shared backup path protection (SBPP) scheme is favored for optical networking and 
Multi-protocol Label Switching (MPLS) applications [26-27]. It is a path-oriented protection 
scheme with a particular combination of operational simplicity, speed, and efficiency that 
makes it of special interest for IP-centric optical network and MPLS layer contexts. The 
Open Shortest Path First - Traffic Engineering (OSPF-TE) and Constraint-based Label 
Distribution Protocol (CRLDP) type protocols enable service layer applications to set up 
their own SBPP path arrangements on demand. In addition, SBPP is a failure independent 
path oriented scheme where the protection route is identified in advance, but spare capacity 
has to be cross-connected on the backup route in real time. In other words, SBPP is an 
intermediate scheme between pure restoration and pure protection. It is perhaps best 
described as a preplanned restoration scheme. Any failure that affects the working path 
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causes a switchover to the predefined backup route and cross-connection to form a backup 
path. One can equivalently think of SBPP as a form of 1+1 APS dedicated path protection, 
while the capacity used to form the protection path is shared over failure of disjoint working 
paths.  
Moreover, it might be difficult to know immediately where the failure has occurred. The 
failure condition may only be known at the end nodes of the paths affected. In this case, the 
SBPP scheme can decide in advance upon a set of end to end backup paths that are fully 
disjoint from each working path protected. The advantage is that it allows activation of the 
switchover by the end nodes without any other knowledge about the failure. For efficiency, 
the spare capacity is shared among backup paths that have disjoint working routes. For 
coordination of this capacity sharing, the global information on the relationship between the 
working and protection paths is required.    
2.2 Spare Capacity Allocation Problem 
Compared to the restoration schemes which have no spare capacity pre-allocated before 
failure, in SBPP scheme, the pre-planning spare capacity mechanism not only guarantees 
service, but also minimizes the recovery time and range of the failure impact. This sort of 
service guarantees are especially important in packet-switching networks because backlog 
traffic accumulated during the failure recovery might introduce significant congestion [28-
29] and it can be somehow mitigated by the pre-planning spare capacity mechanism. On the 
other hand, to reserve additional spare capacity will cause increased usage on network 
resources and degrade the network capacity for new traffic requirements under normal 
conditions. Thus, how to efficiently utilize spare capacity resources is becoming a more and 
more critical issue in network resilience design.  
        The SCA design can take the form of either a two -step or a single-step problem. In the 
two-step problem, working paths are routed first by some method and usually follow the 
shortest path routing, and then a spare capacity allocation (SCA) procedure optimally 
determines the restoration routing in the network. In the single step SCA design problem, 
working and protection paths routing, and subsequent working and spare capacity 
determination are performed jointly, so that the total network capacity cost is optimized. This 
joint optimization method is generally called Joint Capacity Allocation (JCA). This allows 
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working paths to be routed in other than a shortest path manner, so that in conjunction with 
the spare capacity needed for protection, the total capacity requirement is minimized.  
        There are various methods for implementing SCA and JCA design problems, and the 
exact model used will depend on the specific protection mechanism employed within the 
network. For instance, the SCA design problem for a link protection network is generally a 
form of non-simultaneous single-commodity capacity allocation problem [30] and early 
work on similar problems was to support time-varying network flow patterns. The main 
difference in applying that work to link protection is that we delete one link of the network 
for each of the non-simultaneous flow requirements, thereby simulating link failures. Other 
work that was done specifically for transport network restoration started with a proposed 
Linear Programming (LP) representation of the SCA based on a min-cut max-flow model 
[31]. Here, spare capacity is allocated so that for each possible link failure, the minimum 
spare capacity cutset on the surviving links is sufficient for full protection of the failed link’s 
working capacity. In this context, they have defined a cutset as any set of links whose 
removal from the network would result in the end nodes of the failed link being in two 
disconnected components of the network. The minimum spare capacity cutset is the one 
whose links carry the minimum total spare capacity and it is shown that the maximum flow 
possible between any two nodes in a network is equivalent to the minimum spare capacity 
cutset.  One technical challenge with this approach is that the number of possible cutsets in a 
network is O (2L), where L is the number of links, and so enumerating all cutsets becomes 
computationally infeasible. Thus, finding a suitably small subset of cutset that fully constrain 
the solution and also permit an optimal (or near-optimal) capacity design is difficult. 
Enhancements in [32] use an efficient algorithm to discover relevant new cutsets and a “path 
table” data structure to allow for fast restorability testing. For more information on the min-
cut max-flow solution methods for the SCA problem, refer to [26, 31, 32]. 
        In addition, a link-path LP model for the SCA problem in a link protection network was 
proposed in [33-34]. Here the network topology is first pre-processed to find all distinct 
logical routes that are feasible for use in the restoration of each failure scenario. Spare 
capacity values on each link are sized to support the largest assignment of simultaneous 
restoration flows over the feasible protection routes crossing each link in the network over all 
non-simultaneous failure scenarios such that the total spare capacity is minimized. The 
number of distinct routes possible is O (2L), but the complexity of the problem can be greatly 
reduced in practice by reducing the number of feasible routes provided to the problem, 
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through the use of route hop-limits to restrict route lengths with little or no loss of solution 
quality. This approach also gives a detailed explicit specification of restoration routes and 
flows, while the min-cut max-flow approach does not. Another practical advantage of the 
link-path method is that restoration route properties can be controlled to limit such properties 
as length, hop count, signal loss, etc., for each failure scenario, while the min-cut max-flow 
approach does not. The SCA design problem can also be expressed in the form of a set of 
transshipment or network flow LP problems [35]. In a network flow problem, supply nodes 
and demand nodes act as sources and destinations of a commodity (i.e., a path demand), and 
transshipment nodes simply act as intermediaries that pass along any of the commodity it 
receives to other nodes. Like the link-path model, the network flow model can explicitly 
specify the amount of flow over restoration routes, but it does not allow for easy control of 
restoration route properties. 
        The network SCA design methods used in this dissertation follow the link-path type of 
model. The exact structure of the models differs depending on the survivable routing 
mechanism we are using, but in general, all such models require an explicit enumeration of a 
set of feasible restoration routes and in the case of joint designs, working routes as well. 
2.3 ILP models for SCA  
 
In this section, we shall discuss ILP models for protection schemes based on the abstract 
graph representation of the network. The degree of a node is the number of links incident to 
the node. A network is said to be 2-connected if there are at least two node-disjoint paths 
between any pair of nodes. The survivable network must be at least 2-connected. The 
problem of selecting a minimum cost set of links to ensure that a network is 2-connected is a 
fundamental problem in SCA design. We have modified the link-path models for link 
protection, SBPP and p-cycle SCA mechanisms based on some previous work [26, 36-38], 
which will be used to benchmark the SCA mechanism to our proposed heuristic solution and 
also to find the correlation between the topological metric and the total capacity allocated. 
2.3.1 Link Protection 
The basic link-path model of the SCA problem in a link protection network uses the 
following notation: 
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Sets:  
• L , the set of links in the network, and is typically indexed by i when referring to a 
failure link and j when referring to a corresponding protection link; 
• iP , the set of all distinct feasible routes available to carry restoration flow for failure 
of link i, and is typically indexed by p. 
Input parameters,  
• jc , the cost of each unit of capacity (working or spare) on link j; 
• iw , the amount of working capacity to be protected on link i; 
• 
,
{0,1}pi jδ ∈ , a parameter that encodes the protection routes. If , 1pi jδ = , the route p is 
used for protection of link i and it traverses link j. If 
,
0pi jδ = , the route p is used for 
protection of link i but it does not traverse link j. 
Decision variables: 
• 0js ≥ , the amount of spare capacity that is allocated on link j; 
• 0pif ≥ , the amount of protection flow assigned to route p for failure of link i. 
        The ILP model for the link protection SCA is then expressed as follow,  
                                                  Minimize j j
j
c s
∀ ∈
⋅∑
L
                                      (2.1) 
                               Subject to
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i i
p P
f w
∀ ∈
=∑ , i∀ ∈L                                       (2.2) 
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p p
i j i j
p P
f sδ
∀ ∈
⋅ ≤∑ , |i j i j∀ ∈ ≠L                                   (2.3) 
        The objective function in equation (2.1) minimizes the total cost of spare capacity 
allocation in the network. We usually associate jc  with the length of the link i.e., the 
Euclidean distance between the end-nodes of the link, and in general, this cost can be 
regarded as representing the actual costs of fiber, cable etc. The constraints in equation (2.2) 
ensure that the total capacity assigned to all feasible protection routes for failure of link i is 
sufficient to fully protect whole working capacity on the failed link i. Equation (2.3) 
guarantees enough spare capacity on each protection link j to accommodate all restoration 
flows traversing it to protect failed link i for any i. In other words, each js  quantity in 
equation (2.3) is determined by the largest sum of simultaneously imposed protection flows 
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on link j, over all non-simultaneous failure scenarios not involving link j itself as a failed 
component. Thus, the spare capacity assigned to each link j could arise from any of a number 
of different finite-flow sub-problems, there is such a sub-problem for each link failure 
scenario. Each individual failure scenario, taken in isolation, is similar to a two terminal 
minimum cost network flow problem, but the model above couples them all together under 
the objective of minimum spare capacity. It is for this reason that the constraints in equation 
(2.3) are not strict equalities; the spare capacity required on link j for one particular failure 
scenario may exceed that required for another failure scenario. The overall result of the 
model is a minimum sum of link-based maximum quantities of the protection flows assigned 
to each link.  
        In case of a WDM optical network where a unit of capacity represents an individual 
wavelength, the SCA problem could be solved as a pure ILP, with all js  and 
p
if variables 
taking on strictly integer values only. The SCA problem can be solved as an LP for runtime 
considerations i.e., ILPs are much more difficult to solve than LPs, and rounding and 
variable adjustments were used to approximate the optimal integer solution. This can usually 
be done with only minor loss of optimality, as discussed in [39-40], as long as the capacity 
variables ( js ) are integer, the integrality requirement on the underlying flow variables ( pif ) 
can be relaxed without affecting optimality or feasibility.  
        The SCA problem for a link protection network can easily be modified and formulated 
as the JCA problem in order to perform joint working and spare capacity optimization. To do 
so, the prior iw  input parameters become output variables, we need to modify the objective 
function, and add two new constraints to ensure the routing of working demands and 
adequate working capacity to support them.  Let:  
• D, the set of working path demands, and is typically indexed by r. 
• 
rQ , the set of all feasible routes available to carry working path for demand r, and is 
typically indexed by q. 
        In addition, we introduce the following new input parameters as: 
• 
rd , the number of traffic demand units for demand r. 
                                                                                                                                               21 
  
• 
, {0,1)r qjξ ∈ , a parameter that encodes working routes. If ,r qjξ  = 1, the working route 
q is used for demand r that crosses link j. If ,r qjξ  = 0, the working route q is used for 
demand r and it does not cross link j. 
        New decision variables are:  
• 
, 0r qg ≥ , the amount of working flow assigned to working route q used for demand 
r. 
• 0jw ≥ , the amount of working capacity that is allocated to link j (this was formerly 
an input parameter). 
        All previous notations used in equations (2.1) to (2.3) of the link protection network 
problem remain. In order to consider working capacities in addition to spare capacity, we 
make the following change to the objective function: 
                                              Minimize ( )j j j
j
c s w
∀ ∈
⋅ +∑
L
                            (2.4) 
        Finally, we add two new constraint sets as follows: 
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        Equation (2.5) is the working path routing equivalent to the protection-related 
constraints in equation (2.2). It ensures that the total working flow assigned to all feasible 
working routes for demand r is sufficient to fully route it. Equation (2.6) sizes the working 
capacities on each link in much the same way that equation (2.3) does for spare capacity. The 
main structural difference between those two constraint sets is that in equation (2.6), the 
working flow for each demand is applied to each link at the same time, hence the double 
summation. When sizing spare capacity in equation (2.3), on the other hand, the protection 
flow is applied separately for each link failure scenario. Also, we use equality here, rather 
than an inequality as in equation (2.3). This is because the total working capacity is strictly 
equivalent to that required to carry all working path demands, which are all routed 
simultaneously. While spare capacity in equation (2.3) is sized to accommodate individual 
failure scenarios separately, some of which may require more or less spare capacity than 
others on any particular link. Besides the change to the objective function and the addition of 
the two new constraint sets, the constraints in equations (2.2) and (2.3) remain a part of the 
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JCA model. While the link protection SCA problem can also be solved using the JCA model, 
by simply providing only a single feasible working route e.g., the shortest for each demand, 
it is typically solved using the separate model provided earlier. 
        Many variations of these optimization problems are possible. The model with capacity 
only is one such version where the goal is to minimize the amount of working and/or spare 
capacity required, rather than the cost of such capacity. It can be modeled in two ways, either 
by simply setting all jc  capacity cost values to the same value ( jc =1, j∀ ∈L  is typical), or 
removing the capacity cost parameter jc from the objective function. In the latter case, 
equations (2.1) and (2.4) are replaced by equations (2.7) and (2.8), respectively: 
                                                         Minimize j
j
s
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∑
L
                                   (2.7) 
                                                          j j
j
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L
                                          (2.8) 
        Another common variation of the problem is one where the network does not 
necessarily have to provide full (i.e., 100%) protection for each failure scenario. By 
introducing a new input parameter,  0 1iα≤ ≤  , which represents the proportion factor of 
working capacity on link i that must be protected in the event of failure for that link, we can 
replace equation (2.2) with equation (2.9) as below. The right hand side of this new equation 
now effectively requires sufficient protection flow over all protection routes to restore a 
specified proportion of the failed link’s working capacity. If integrality is strictly asserted on 
the flow variable pif , then it may also be necessary to change the equality in equation (2.9) 
to a weak inequality i.e., “ ≤ ”, since a fractional amount of required working capacity to be 
protected may result. 
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        In equation (2.3), the spare capacity requirements are calculated as the summation of the 
products of protection flow and a {0, 1} binary parameter encoding whether a particular 
route is crossing a particular link, and similarly for equation (2.6) on calculating working 
capacity requirements. However, we can also encode whether a route crosses a link by 
declaring an additional set q ⊆L L , which is the set of links in route q, and it is just as 
easily generated as the 
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. We can then replace equations (2.3) 
and (2.6) with equations (2.10) and (2.11), respectively as below,  
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2.3.2 Shared Backup Path Protection  
In the above models for link protection, only one set of feasible protection routes needs to be 
considered for any given failure scenario, since only a single link fails at any given time, and 
only one commodity requires rerouting. The model for SBPP, on the other hand, needs to 
provide for rerouting of multiple commodities simultaneously and this requires significant 
structural differences in the SBPP mathematical model compared to the link protection 
model. In addition to the notation from above, we add the following new sets:  
 
• 
rQ  , the set of all feasible routes that can be used either for working or protection 
path routing of demand r. It is typically indexed by p if we consider it for working 
path routing or b if we consider it for protection path routing.  
• ⊆r rjQ Q , the set of all feasible routes that can be used either for working or 
protection path routing of demand r, which traverses link j. 
• ⊆L Lq  , the set of links in route q ∈
rQ , as described above. 
 
         In addition, we have the following decision variables: 
• {0,1}rbx ∈ , a variable that encodes the assignment of protection routes. If rbx =1, 
then protection route b is used to protect demand r. If rbx  = 0, then protection route b 
is not assigned to protect demand r. 
• {0,1}rpy ∈ , a variable that encodes the assignment of working routes. If rpy  = 1, 
then working route p is assigned for routing of demand r. If rpy = 0, then working 
route p is not assigned for routing of demand r. 
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• 
,
{0,1}rp bz ∈ , a variable that jointly encodes the assignment of protection routes and 
working routes, and acts as a variable that encodes the product of rbx  and 
r
by . If ,
r
p bz  
= 1, then working route p and protection route b are both assigned for use by demand 
r. If 
,
r
p bz  = 0, then at least one of working route p and protection route b is not 
assigned for use by demand r. If 
,
r
p bz  did not exist as a separate variable, then 
equation (2.19) below would need to contain a product of two variables, which 
would make this model non-linear. 
 
        Therefore, the SBPP JCA model can be expressed as follows: 
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        The objective function (2.12) minimizes the total cost of working and spare capacity 
needed to provide working and protection paths routing of all demands, which is the same 
objective function as that for the link protection JCA model in equation (2.4). The constraints 
set in equation (2.13) force that there is exactly one working route for each demand r. 
Equation (2.14) determines the amount of working capacity required on each link to 
accommodate the working path routing; the working capacity on a link is equivalent to the 
sum of the number of working demand units of each demand r, whose working route p 
crosses the link. Equation (2.15) ensures that there is exactly one protection route assigned 
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for each demand r. In equation (2.16), any given route q can only be assigned as the working 
route or the protection route for a demand r (or neither), but not both. While this constraint is 
not strictly required because later constraints will ensure link disjointedness between any 
working and protection routes, this added-value constraint helps to more directly confine the 
feasible solution space of the ILP. Equation (2.17) assigns values to the 
,
r
p bz  variables, 
which are used in the constraints set that follows. If rbx =0 and 
r
py  = 0, i.e., neither routes p 
nor b are assigned as the working and protection route, respectively, for demand r, then 
,
r
p bz  
will be allowed to equal 0, and since 
,
r
p bz = 0 can only ever decrease spare capacity costs via 
the combination of other constraints in the model, then that is the value it will take. On the 
other hand, if rbx =1 and /or
r
py  = 1, i.e., at least one of routes p or b are assigned as the 
working and protection route, respectively, for demand r, then 
,
r
p bz will have to equal 1 for 
the constraint to be satisfied. Effectively, this is equivalent to 
,
r r r
p b b pz x y= ⋅ , but since that is 
a non-linear equation, then we must express it as we have; its purpose will become apparent 
in the discussion of equation (2.19), below. The constraints in equation (2.18) ensure that for 
each route p for demand r that crosses failed link i, if that route is assigned as the working 
route (i.e., rpy  = 1 ), then that demand must be assigned a protection route b that does not 
cross the failed link (i.e., bi ∉L  ). Finally, in equation (2.19), sufficient spare capacity is 
assigned to each surviving link j to accommodate all protection route assignments that 
simultaneously cross that link for each failure scenario. More specifically, the spare capacity 
on protection link j must equal or exceed the sum of the number of path units of all demand r 
that are assigned protection route b which crosses link j, and working route p which crosses 
failed link i, thus routes p and b are disjoint, i.e., p b∩ = ∅L L . If route p is not assigned as 
the working route for demand r and/or route b is not assigned as the protection route, then 
from equation (2.17), 
,
r
p bz = 0, and so the only combination of working and protection routes 
that will contribute to the spare capacity of link j is the pair that is actually assigned.  
        As in the link protection problem, we can also enforce integrality on the jw  working 
capacity and js  spare capacity variables to correspond to WDM optical networking where a 
unit of capacity represents an individual wavelength. We must also enforce integrality on 
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the rbx ,
r
py  and ,
r
p bz  variables since they must strictly be either equivalent to 0 or 1 in order to 
have any meaning. Since there are no other output variables in this model, we must therefore 
solve the SBPP JCA design problem as a pure ILP. In much the same way that the link-
protection SCA design problem could be solved by using the link-protection JCA model, we 
can solve the SBPP SCA design problem with only a simple modification to the SBPP JCA 
model. To do so, values for the rpy  variables encoding whether an route p is a working route 
for demand r or not are assigned as inputs so that rpy =1, for example, the shortest route p 
assigned to be the working route for demand r, and rpy  = 0 for all other routes for demand r. 
Equation (2.13) becomes redundant but still holds, and all other constraint sets remain 
unaffected.  
        In these circumstances, it would also be wise to ensure that route sets provided for each 
demand contain only those routes that are link disjoint from the working route, so as not to 
unnecessarily add to the complexity of the problem by including routes and all the 
accompanying parameters, variables, and constraints that could not possibly be chosen as 
protection routes. Under the same objective of minimizing working and spare capacity costs, 
the model determines which pair of routes each demand is assigned for working and 
protection paths routing, subject to the same sets of constraints above. In other words, there 
is only a single working and protection route per demand, and spare capacity is sufficient to 
accommodate all simultaneously required protection routes for each link failure scenario. 
More details on this design model can be found in [26].  
2.3.3 P-Cycles 
Another ILP model for SCA for survivable routing that has been developed here is p-cycle 
protection. The p-cycle design problem differs structurally from the link protection and 
SBPP schemes in one key fashion: the optimization is in the form of a choice between 
feasible cycles rather than a choice between feasible routes. As such, we need to introduce 
new notation to properly encode cycles and to identify straddling links and on-cycle links. In 
addition to the notation used in previous models, we add the following new sets:  
 
• C, the set of feasible cycles that can be used to provide p-cycle protection for 
working links in the network and is indexed by p. 
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        We also have the following parameters:   
• 
,
{0,1,2}p jx ∈ , a parameter equivalent to the number of protection relationships 
provided by a unit-sized copy of p-cycle p for working links on link j. Recalling  that 
a p-cycle provides protection for one working link on an on-cycle link and two 
working links on a straddling link. Thus, 
,p jx =1 if link j is an on-cycle link for cycle 
p,
,p jx =2 if link j is a straddling link for cycle p, ,p jx =0, if link j is neither an on-
cycle or straddling link for cycle p. 
 
        Also, a new decision variable is added:  
• pn  ≥ 0, the number of unit-sized copies of p-cycle p placed in the network. 
        Therefore, the full ILP model of the joint capacity allocation of p-cycle protection 
design is as follows: 
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j
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        Equations (2.20), (2.21), and (2.22) are identical to prior equations seen in link-
protection JCA design and SBPP JCA design. Equation (2.20) minimizes the cost of working 
and spare capacity required in the network, while equations (2.21) and (2.22) ensure 
sufficient working flows to carry all demands, and calculate the working capacity required to 
accommodate those working flows, respectively. The constraint set in equation (2.23) 
ensures that for the failure of any link i, the p-cycles placed in the network provide enough 
protection relationships to fully reroute all of the working capacity on the failed link. Note 
that if 
,p jx = 1 , then p-cycle p will provide protection for one of the working links on link i 
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per copy of the p-cycle, if 
,p jx =2, then p-cycle p will provide protection for two of the 
working links on link i per copy of the p-cycle, and if 
,p jx = 0, then p-cycle p will not 
provide any protection for working links on link i. Equation (2.24) determines the amount of 
spare capacity on each link j as a result of the p-cycles placed in equation (2.23) that cross 
that link. The only spare capacity optimization version of the above problem can be easily 
modeled by simply removing the constraint sets in equation (2.21) and (2.22), turning the 
jw decision variables into input parameters with values e.g., the shortest path routing of 
demands, and also removing jw  from the objective function. 
2.4 Feasible Routes Enumeration in ILP models  
 
All of the ILP models developed in Section 2.3 are not limited to any particular network. 
They are applicable to any network by using appropriate pre-processing methods to fully 
express the design problems with the proper sets of feasible routes and/or cycles required. In 
order to obtain the strictly optimal solution to one of the design problems, the feasible route 
and/or cycle sets need to contain all distinct routes and/or cycles in network. However, for 
even moderately sized networks, such route sets and cycle sets are very large. A common 
and practical approach to deal with this issue is to set a hop limit, denoted as H, on the 
feasible routes, such that only those routes have H or fewer links are considered as feasible 
routes. The thinking is that since using shorter routes will require less capacity than using 
longer routes, then providing the problem with only short routes should allow a relatively 
efficient design. However, it is clear that as H is increased, more sharing-efficient patterns of 
re-routing are permitted, which is demonstrated in [34]. This allows for a fairly good trade-
off between problem complexity and solution quality. A large H provides a greater number 
of routing options for the problem to choose from thereby reducing overall design costs but 
increasing the complexity of the problem i.e., the greater the number of feasible working 
and/or protection routes, the greater the number of constraints and variables in a design 
problem. A smaller H, on the other hand, restricts the number of routing options available.  
Although the complexity of the problem may be greatly reduced, but it is forced to select 
slightly less efficient and possibly more capacity will be allocated. As also shown in [34], 
there is some threshold hop limit, H*, at which the theoretical minimum of capacity 
requirements is reached. In other words, the solution obtained when using no hop limit at all 
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is not better than that obtained when using a hop limit of H*. We note that the exact value of 
H* is dependent on a variety of factors, including the network topology, demands, and link 
costs, and cannot be pre-determined analytically. Other options for restricting the number of 
feasible routes is to use distance limits, cost limits, or even optical path loss limits, all of 
which will provide trade-offs similar to that provided by a strict hop limit. One practical 
problem comes when a network contains sparsely connected regions with long chains and/or 
low nodal degree as well as other more richly connected regions with higher nodal degree. In 
this case, a hop limit of H = 10, for example, may be necessary to provide even a single 
feasible protection route for some links in a sparsely connected region, while using that same 
hop limit might produce many thousands of feasible protection routes in a richly connected 
region of the same network.  
        In this dissertation, we use a related strategy that is both effective and practical at 
representing and solving the design models, and also greatly improves the scalability of the 
problem to permit solution of quite large network design problems with a variety of richly 
and sparsely connected regions. The idea is not to presume a specific network-wide hop or 
length limit and attempt to generate all distinct routes up to that limit, but rather to use a 
procedure that results in a specified number of the shortest distinct feasible routes at 
whatever hop or length limit is required independently of one another. So for instance, if we 
specify that at least 10 feasible protection routes for each demand, then the procedure is to 
enumerate the 10 shortest distinct protection routes for it separately.  
2.5 Capacity Sharing Information in SCA  
 
All of the above models are assumed to applying centralized preplanning routing. In addition, 
routing method that picks the shortest backup path can also provide an approximate solution. 
Such methods have been extensively used for network design problems including SCA. The 
advantage for this algorithm is the fast solution speed but optimality is sacrificed and further 
adjustment are required for solution improvement as shown in [41]. The major bottleneck for 
routing based SCA algorithm is whether the spare capacity is shared among different failures, 
since such sharing can significantly reduce network redundancy, which has been extensively 
studied recently.  
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        The Sharing with Partial routing Information (SPI) and Sharing with Complete routing 
Information (SCI) were introduced by [42]. In SPI, the backup path routing is based on the 
shortest path algorithm while the resource minimization is approximated by using modified 
link costs in routing. Although SPI is simple and fast, as shown in their numerical results, the 
redundancy obtained by SPI is not very close to the optimal results. While for a centralized 
SCI scheme, per-flow based information is necessary to find optimal results. Some other 
research efforts on this sort of routing-based algorithm for allocating spare capacity and 
backup paths can be found in [43-45]. The online algorithm introduced in [43] uses the  
shortest path algorithm to route a backup path for each flow sequentially. One of its 
differences from other routing based algorithms is that the routing link metrics are based on 
so called buckets. Each bucket of a link maintains the maximum spare capacity required on 
this link when one of the other links fails. The link metric is calculated based on a non-linear 
function of these buckets. Moreover, the Distributed Partial Information Management (DPIM) 
scheme [46-47] was proposed, in order to reduce the state information complexity from 
2( )O L  of the spare provision matrix down to ( )O L with a trade-off in solution optimality. 
The proposed information collection process only needs to collect partial information for the 
spare capacity sharing in order to have less complexity. 
        The centralized SCA algorithms will result in slow restoration response times due to the 
network state information collecting and dispatching process. The distributed algorithms 
introduced so far, encounter scalability problems for flow numbers and network sizes and 
therefore still cannot achieve high resource efficiency. An efficient and fast spare capacity 
allocation (SCA) algorithm which can be implemented in a distributed fashion is needed. 
This strongly motives us to seek a new solution, to be referred as the Distributed Resilience 
Matrix (DRM) framework to tackle the above difficulties. 
2.6 Summary 
 
In this chapter, we gave an overview of network resilience techniques and then described the 
spare capacity allocation (SCA) problem for survivable routing. An in-depth description of 
the spare capacity allocation (SCA) problem was provided and the ILP models for link 
protection, p-cycles and SBPP mechanisms were developed and discussed. Essential 
information on the dependence between working and spare capacity in SCA, which is 
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essential for exploring the sharing potentials among protection paths for survivable routing, 
was also introduced. 
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Chapter 3 
Distributed Resilience Matrix 
 
 
Fast recovery from failures, including efficient allocation of capacity in a network for 
guaranteeing seamless communication services, is the primary goal of spare capacity 
allocation (SCA) design in survivable routing. The level of capacity sharing that can be 
achieved for a given network depends on how detailed is the capacity usage information 
available at the source nodes, which is used to identify the dependencies between the 
working and protection capacities associated with each pair of links. In this chapter, we 
investigate such dependencies based on a new SCA structure, called the Distributed 
Resilience Matrix (DRM) under a distributed control environment.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. First, we introduce some 
background knowledge on capacity sharing. The Spare Provision Matrix (SPM), which 
gracefully models the dependencies between working and protection capacity is introduced 
and then the novel Distributed Resilience Matrix (DRM) is presented. We also compare the 
DRM with the SPM to show its advantages for capturing network capacity usage information 
in a distributed manner. Finally, the essential signaling functions to update and exchange 
capacity usage information in DRM are described.  
3.1 Information on Capacity Sharing  
In the SBPP mechanism, the amount of capacity sharing that can be achieved among the 
protection paths depends on the capacity usage information available at the source nodes. 
There are three scenarios of available information to be considered. They can be categorized 
as the cases of minimal, partial and complete information in [48]. In the Sharing with 
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Minimal Information (SMI), the only information that the source node has is the residual 
capacity on each link. Therefore, it is not possible to do any sharing among the protection 
paths since the information for setting up shared paths is not available. In the Sharing with 
Partial Information (SPI), the source node has access to more information. Namely, it knows 
the total amount of capacity used by the working and protection paths, respectively. The SPI 
is fairly modest in terms of the amount of information to be maintained, and because only 
aggregate information is needed, it is easy to maintain it in a distributed fashion. In the last 
and ideal scenario, i.e., Sharing with Complete Information (SCI), the source node has 
complete information and it knows the route details for all the current traffic flows. While 
this sort of routing needs to be implemented in a centralized manner and it would be very 
difficult to disseminate complete routing information to all the nodes as the network size 
grows significantly. Among these three scenarios, SCI promises the best sharing of resources 
but implies a large overhead and it features poor scalability for large networks. Therefore, we 
propose the Distributed Resilience Matrix (DRM) to implement the SCI under a distributed 
control environment. 
3.1.1 Background on Capacity Sharing  
Given a network topology and traffic flows, the objective of the SCA mechanism is to 
optimize the total cost of network capacity allocated. The decision variables include where to 
route working and protection paths, and how much spare capacity should be reserved. The 
protection paths can share the capacity among common links if their corresponding working 
paths are not subject to the same failure. This additional information on the relationship 
between working and protection paths is critical for exploring the capacity sharing potentials 
in the network.  
 
Figure 3.1 An example of capacity sharing in a simple network with 6 nodes 
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        An example of capacity sharing in a simple network with 6 nodes is shown in Figure 3.1 
above. We assume that there are two traffic flows between nodes “a” and “e” with capacity 
requirements b1 and b2 by using two disjoint working paths (WPs) i.e., WP1= (1, 5) and 
WP2= (2, 7, 10), respectively. Under the single failure scenario, the two WPs cannot fail at 
the same time. Accordingly, their corresponding protection paths will not to be used at the 
same time. Therefore, their two corresponding protection paths (PPs), i.e., PP1 and PP2 can 
all use path (3, 8) and they can share the protection capacity on link 3 and link 8 without 
affecting the survivability of either connection. The total reserved protection capacity that 
needs be allocated on links 3 and 8 for the two WPs is max {b1, b2} rather than b1+ b2.  
        In the case of a new incoming flow r uses link i in its protection path, the capacity along 
link i can be categorized into three types as shown in Figure 3.2 below. 
 
Figure 3.2 An illustration of capacity categories in link i  
 
• Free capacity, denoted as if , which is the link capacity that can be allocated as either 
working or spare capacity;  
• Working capacity, denoted as iw , which is the capacity occupied by the existent 
working paths and cannot be taken for any other use until the corresponding working 
paths are torn down.  
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• Spare capacity, denoted as is , which is the link capacity reserved by the existing 
protection paths. With knowledge of the relationship between the working and protection 
paths, the spare capacity in link i can be further categorized into the following two types 
according to the new coming flow r. 
 Sharable spare capacity, denoted as ris , which is the link capacity that has been 
occupied by some other protection paths, but it is still sharable to traffic flow r, 
because their working paths are disjoint. 
 Non-sharable spare capacity, denoted as *ris , which is the link capacity that has 
been occupied by some protection paths and it is not sharable to traffic flow r 
because their working paths overlap somewhere. 
 
The information about the relationship between the working and protection paths in the 
SCA structure has been investigated by a number of researchers. The fault management table 
(FMT) method is the foundation for the Resource Aggregation Fault Tolerant (RAFT) 
scheme [49].It provides a local data structure to store the spare capacity sharing information 
among different flows. It is very difficult to use the FMT to share this information globally 
since such information is per-flow based and hence it is not scalable with network size and 
number of flows. In addition, a two-dimensional array between failed link and link with 
spare capacity is proposed in [50] and the spare capacity can be also found using this array. 
Then the routing algorithm can use part of the information to build routing metrics to route 
protection paths. The “channel dependency graph” was introduced in [51] to analyze network 
fault tolerance when failure protection routes exist in a parallel computing system. Though it 
concentrates on the question of how many faults that a fault tolerant routing function can 
deal with, the dependency relation between links on working and protection paths is shown 
through a dual graph.  
        In addition, the backup load distribution matrix (BLDM) was introduced in [52], which 
can capture the partial network state and greatly reduces the amount of routing information 
maintained and exchanged. The spare provision matrix (SPM) has been proposed and further 
developed in [53-56], which is a milestone structure that allows concise modeling of 
dependencies between working and protection capacities based on a matrix form. In addition, 
an improvement to the link-state information dissemination process, called Sharing with 
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Reduced Information (SRI) [57-58] was introduced, it takes the advantage of the Singular 
Value Decomposition (SVD) technique [59] performed at each node for increasing the 
precision of SPM reconstruction. Their study has shown much improvement in the precision 
of SPM reconstruction.  
From the above discussion, we can see that the SCA is a challenging combinatorial 
optimization problem and its structure is still under study [60]. Therefore, instead of using 
the estimation method or the complex SVD transformation to reconstruct the SPM or its 
similar structure BLDM in a distributed way, we propose a new Distributed Resilience 
Matrix (DRM) structure to decompose the SPM into the local dependency table for each link 
radiating from individual nodes. It significantly mitigates problems related to the difficulty of 
precise estimation of sharable spare capacity. 
3.1.2 The SPM structure 
The previous studies on dynamic survivable routing considered that, under the sharing with 
the complete information scenario (SCI), the knowledge of all the existing working and 
protection paths in the network can be concisely modeled using the spare provision matrix 
(SPM) introduced in [53]. In the SPM structure, a network is represented by an undirected 
graph with N nodes, L links and R flows. A traffic flow r, 1 ≤ r ≤ R, is specified by its source 
and destination node pair ( ( ), ( ))o r d r and traffic demand
r
d here we assume only 1 unit of 
traffic demand for each flow, so 1
r
d = for all r. 
 
 
Figure 3.3 An example network of 6 nodes and 10 links. 
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Figure 3.4 An example of SPM structure: matrices P and Q  
        As shown in Figures 3.3 and 3.4, in an SPM structure, the working and protection paths 
of flow r are represented by two 1 L× binary row vectors { }
r rlp p= and { }r rlq q= , 
respectively. The l-th element in one of the vectors equals “1” if and only if (iff) the 
corresponding path uses link l. The path-link incidence matrices for working and protection 
paths are the collections of these vectors, forming two R L×  matrices { }
rlp=P and 
{ }
rlq=Q respectively. Let 1({ } )r RxDiag d=D denote the diagonal matrix representing the 
demands of flows. If the protection level of flows is under 100%, the elements in D can be 
adjusted to reserve partial spare capacities on protection paths.   
 
            
TG = Q DP                                            (3.1) 
                max  
row
=s G                                             (3.2) 
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Figure 3.5 An example of Spare Provision Matrix (SPM) G and column vector s 
As shown in Figure 3.5, given the protection paths matrix Q, demand matrix D, and 
working paths matrix P, the spare provision matrix G can be determined by equation (3.1). 
Here it uses { }lk L Kg ×=G denote the SPM whose elements lkg  are the minimum spare 
capacity required on link l when single link k failed. The minimum spare capacity required 
on each link is denoted by the column vector 1{ }l Ls ×=s  which is calculated in equation 
(3.2). The function max in equation (3.2) asserts that any element in the spare capacity vector 
s is equal to the maximum number in the corresponding row of G. The row max operation 
guarantees that spare capacity in s is large enough to cover the capacity required by different 
failures. In this way, the minimum spare capacity on a link is always equal to the maximum 
spare capacity required by any single link failure.        
        While another way to calculate G instead of the SPM structure is to aggregate per-flow 
based information of working and protection paths. The contribution of a traffic flow r to G 
is given by { }rlk L Lg ×=rG , where rp and  rq  are the row vectors. Thus, the spare provision 
matrix G can be also calculated in an aggregated version from:   
                                             ( ),    ,1T
r r r
d q p r r R= ∀ ≤ ≤rG                                (3.3) 
                                                            
1
R
r=
= ∑ rG G                                                  (3.4) 
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3.2 Proposed DRM structure 
In the SPM structure introduced above, the minimum spare capacity reserved on a link is 
always equal to the maximum spare capacity required by any single link failure and the 
maximum extent of spare resource sharing is achieved by assuming that each node must have 
per-flow information to acquire the matrix P and Q. In this SCI scheme, each node needs to 
broadcast information about its engagement in each flow. This yields a dissemination 
complexity O(RL), making this scheme impractical in a distributed control environment. To 
tackle this problem, we propose a new structure named Distributed Resilience Matrix 
(DRM), which bears the same complete dependency information to obtain the vector s. In 
addition, it is done only by using simplified additive operations, instead of the multiplicative 
operations needed for SPM, and the complexity of the information exchange decreases to 
O(L).  
        In DRM structure, we let T =D·(P-Q) denote the complete DRM. Its negative entries 
represent protection capacity, while positive entries mean working capacity. In each row, we 
can identify the capacity used and the links traversed by the WP (if it is positive) and PP (if it 
is negative) for each row associated with its corresponding flow. In each column, the sum of 
positive entries represents the total amount of working capacity used by traffic flows in that 
link and the sum of negative entries represents the capacity reserved as protection capacity in 
each link by other WPs. An example of the complete T is illustrated in Figure 3.6 below. 
 
               Figure 3.6 Example of complete T 
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         Such a matrix T captures the complete per-flow information. For example, at node “a”, 
it has three adjacent links: links 1, 2 and 3. The 1st , 2nd  and 3rd columns of T record the 
traffic flows which traverse them and the capacity usage status. Negative values in a given 
row indicate the links used by the PP, and positive values indicate links used by WP of a 
given flow. We can further decompose the complete T into DRM of individual nodes. For 
example, the local DRM in node a, denoted as T_Node_a only needs to record the capacity 
usage information related to links 1, 2 and 3 (i.e., highlighted in ‘blue’), see Figure 3.7. 
 
 
Figure 3.7 The necessary information in T 
 
for links 1-3 at node “a” 
        Furthermore, the matrix T_Node_a can be further decomposed into three matrices, each 
for one of its three adjacent links, as seen in Figure 3.8, i.e., T_Link_1, T_Link_2 and 
T_Link_3. The mapping rules between each node’s matrix and its adjacent links’ matrix can 
be specified as follows:  
• If flow r traverses link l in its working path, then T_Link_l [n, l]>0, where n denotes 
the number of flows that use link l either in their working path or protection path, 
and n=0; n:=n+1 as a new flow r uses link l;  
• If flow r traverses the link l in its protection path, then T_Link_l [n, m...]<0, where 
m... indicates all links traversed in the working path of flow r, and  n=0; n:=n+1 as a 
new flow r uses link l. 
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        For example, flow 1 uses link 1 in its working path, so in T_Link_1:  
n=0+1 and T_Link_1 [1, 1] =1  
        Also, flow 1 uses link 3 in its protection path, so in T_Link_3: 
                                                  n=0+1 and T_Link_3 [1, 1] = -1  
        In addition, flow 2 uses link 2 in its working path, so in T_Link_2: 
                                                  n=0+1 and T_Link_2 [1, 2] =1 
       Flow 2 also uses link 3 in its protection, so in T_Link_3: 
                                                 n=1+1 and T_Link_3 [2, 2] = -1  
        Following the above mapping, the resulting three T_Link_l matrices for link l, l=1, 2 
and 3 adjacent to node “a” is shown in Figure 3.8 below.  
 
Figure 3.8 Local T_Link_l, l=1, 2 and 3 in node a 
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        The other resulting T_Link_l matrices stored at nodes from “b” to “f” are shown in 
Figures 3.9 - 3.13 below. 
 
 
Figure 3.9 Local T_Link_l, l=1, 4 and 5 in node b  
 
 
Figure 3.10 Local T_Link_l, l=2, 6, and 7 in node c 
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Figure 3.11 Local T_Link_l, l= 3,4,6,8 and 9 in node d 
 
 
Figure 3.12 Local T_Link_l, l=5, 8, and10 in node e 
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Figure 3.13 Local T_Link_l, l=7, 9, and10 in node f 
        After all the mappings, the summation of each column in each T_Link_l
 
matrix is 
performed to obtain a row vector, for example in link 1, we get T_Link_1[5, …] = [3, 0, 0, -1, 
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]. The negative number in T_Link_1[5, 4] represents the minimum spare 
capacity required on link 1 when link 4 failed. From this row vector, the capacity usage 
information for link 1 can be obtained as (3, -1), which means 3 units of working capacity 
are allocated and at least 1 unit of protection capacity needs to be reserved for any single link 
failure. This capacity usage information i.e., 1 unit of spare capacity, obtained from our 
DRM structure is exactly the first value in vector s if the SPM structure is used. In addition, 
we can obtain extra information of working capacity usage in the DRM. 
The main advantage of the DRM structure is that it can be implemented locally, but still 
bear the same information on dependencies as that associated with the centralized SPM 
structure. In addition, although each T_Link_l matrix for link l is flow-based, but it only 
needs to record the flow information related to that link, which largely reduces the storage 
space complexity. For example, there is a  total  of 15 flows in the prior case, but even the 
‘busiest’ link 6 is associated with 7 flows, while the most idle link 5 is only associated with 3 
flows. In addition, with the flow-based information, the DRM can efficiently eliminate the 
bandwidth release ambiguity occurring during traffic demand teardown. For example, as 
shown in Figure 3.8, if node “a” finishes flow 1 transmission, it can immediately tear down 
its working path, but, in the general case, deciding about termination of its protection path is 
problematic. Namely, the source node “a” faces ambiguity on deciding how much capacity 
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should be released on links 3 and 4. When flow 1 was set up, it had reserved 1 unit of spare 
capacity which is now also shared by other protection paths. However, if no flow 1- related 
knowledge is stored at node “a” and “b”, it does not know that other protection path are 
sharing this in links 3 and 4 too. In this case, node “a” cannot release the correct amount of 
capacity without additional knowledge. This limitation results from using only partial 
network state information for path routing. In the DRM structure, the flow based information 
is specified in its related T_Link_l matrices, which can avoid the ambiguity problem. In the 
teardown process, the node “a” only needs to send a ‘flow 1 release’ message to other nodes, 
and the related nodes can easily delete the spare capacity only contributed by flow 1 in the 
T_Link_l matrices.  
        Finally, let us take a closer look at the local T_Link_l  matrix of link l and investigate 
how the DRM structure allows the distributed computation of capacity usage when a new 
traffic request rnew  , say of 1 unit, is to be sent between nodes  “a” and “e”, as shown in 
Figure 3.14.  
 
 
Figure 3.14 The WP and candidate PPs for the new request newr  
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Figure 3.15 Updated T_Link_l for each link according to the new request rnew 
        In Figure 3.14, we have selected WP16 = (1, 5) as the working path, and PP16= (3, 8) or 
PP16’ = (2, 7, 9) are under consideration as candidates for its protection path. The T_Link_l 
is updated, as depicted in Figure 3.15. All the changed values are highlighted in colours: the 
changed values of  working capacity are highlighted in ‘blue’ , and the values highlighted in 
‘red’ and ‘green’ are the changed spare capacity when selecting PP16 and PP16’, 
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respectively. The updated information about the working and spare capacity should be sent 
to the source node by each ingress node of that link. For example with link 8, updated 
information of (2, -3) , is which interpreted as  2 units of working capacity and 3 unit of 
spare capacity, is sent to node “a” by node “d”. Based on the capacity usage information 
collected from all the other nodes, the source node “a” can decide to use PP16’ instead of 
PP16 as the protection path for WP16, since it is more capacity efficient than PP16 and no 
extra units of spare capacity are needed if PP16’ is selected: 0 units in link 2, 7 and 9; while 
2 extra units are needed if PP16 is chosen: 1 unit on link 3 and 1 unit on link 8. Here, it is 
only a simple example of how the local capacity usage information is exchanged in DRM 
structure. In a practical case, this information should be translated into link metrics, which 
are needed in the routing algorithm to decide the merit of a potential path. In the later 
Chapter 4, we give more details of how this capacity usage information is used in the FoF-R 
ant-based routing algorithm.  
3.3 Extension of DRM for Multiple failures 
The DRM structure described above can only handle any single link failure in the network. It 
can also be generalized to handle multiple failures as the SPM structure does. The novel idea 
of failure scenario matrix F={fk}Kx1= {fkl}KxL was introduced in [53] to improve the SPM to 
characterize K failure scenarios. Here, L is the total number of links and the element fkl of 
row vector fk in F equals “1” if link l fails in scenario k. In this way, each failure scenario can 
include a set of links that will fail simultaneously in the scenario. Therefore, the SPM 
structure is generalized as G=QT .D .U, where U=P⊙FT. Note that, the binary matrix 
multiplication operation “⊙” is used here to modify ordinary addition 1+1=2 to Boolean 
addition 1+1=1.  
        To illustrate how the extension of our DRM structure can handle multiple failures like 
SPM by borrowing their failure scenario matrix F, we shall still use the prior example 
network of six-node, as shown in Figure 3.16. This time, we only assume there are three 
traffic flows between nodes “a” and “f” with traffic demands of 10, 8 and 12 units, 
respectively. The corresponding WPs, PPs, P, Q, D and F matrices are illustrated in Figures 
3.16 -3.19 as below.  
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Figure 3.16 Example of working paths 
 
Figure 3.17 Example of protection paths 
 
 
Figure 3.18 Matrices of P, Q and D  
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Figure 3.19 Failure scenario matrix F   
        As shown in Figure 3.19, the F matrix covers all the four single node failures i.e., b, c, d 
and e, excluding the source destination nodes “a” and “f”. Then, we can calculate the SPM G 
by matrix operations G=QT .D .U and the resulting G is shown in Figure 3.20 below. 
 
Figure 3.20 Spare Provision Matrix G and column vector s 
        The minimum spare capacity required on each link in case of any single node failure in 
the k scenario can be obtained by s=max G, which s denotes a vector specifying the 
maximum element of the corresponding rows of G.  
        While in our DRM structure, we first let T=D·(P-Q). The complete DRM T matrix is 
illustrated in Figure 3.21 below. 
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Figure 3.21 Example of complete T in the DRM structure 
        We can further decompose the complete T into DRM matrices of individual nodes. For 
example, the local DRM in node “a”, denoted as T_Node_a only needs to record the capacity 
usage information related to links 1, 2 and 3, as seen in Figure 3.22. 
 
Figure 3.22 The necessary information in  T_Node_a
 
for links 1-3 
        Following the same mapping rules introduced in the previous section, we can finally 
map the T_Node_a into three T_link_l matrices, one for each adjacent link to node “a”, i.e.,  
T_link_1, T_link_2 and T_link_3.  
 
Figure 3.23 Mapping between T_Node_a to T_link_1 
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        For example, as shown in Figure 3.23, flow 1 uses link 1 in its working path, so 
T_link_1 [1,1]=10, while for the flow 2, link 1 is used in its protection path and links 3 and 9 
are used in its working path, so  T_link_1 [2, 3] = -8, T_link_1 [2, 9] = -8. The resulting 
T_link_l matrix for each link l is shown in Figure 3.24.  
 
 
Figure 3.24 Local T_link_l,, l=1,2,…10  
        After all the mappings, column summation is conducted in each T_link_l to obtain row 
vectors e.g.,  T_link_1 = [10, 0, -8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, -8, 0]. The negative numbers here represent 
the minimum spare capacity required on link 1 when link l fails. We can see that link 1 is 
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requires 10 units of working capacity and at least 8 units of protection capacity i.e., “-8” is 
reserved for any single link failure. Based on this procedure, we now can generalize our 
DRM structure to handle multiple failures using the failure scenario matrix F. We also use 
the Boolean addition ⊙ operation such as  T_link_l ⊙FT to derive the information on 
minimum spare capacity required in each link for all single node failure scenarios. For 
example, in link 1, we can obtain that [10, 0, -8, 0] after performing T_link_l ⊙FT, which 
informs us that at least 8 units of protection capacity are needed in link 1 when node “d” fails, 
but any other failure at nodes b, c, e have no impact on link 1. This is exactly the information 
that can be derived from the 1st row of vector s in G of SPM in Figure 3.20.  
        Additionally, we investigate how the T_link_l in DRM structure allows the distributed 
computation on capacity usage when a new traffic request rnew  is arriving between nodes “a” 
and “f” with 10 unit of capacity requirement. We have selected WP4 = (3, 9) as the working 
path, PP4= (1, 5, 10) and PP4’ = (2, 7) are under consideration as the candidate for its 
protection path, as seen in Figure 3.25 below. 
 
 
Figure 3.25  The WP and candidate PPs for a new request rnew 
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Figure 3.26 Updated T_link_l  for each link according to a new request rnew  
        The T_link_l is updated, as seen in Figure 3.26. Here, all the changed values are 
highlighted in colour, where ‘red’ is used for selecting PP4 and ‘blue’ is used for selecting 
PP4’. After the local re-calculation, it can be seen that, using the PP4’ is more efficient than 
PP4, since only 20 extra units of capacity are needed: 10 units in link 2 and 10 units in link 7, 
while 30 units are needed if PP4 is chosen: 10 units each on links 1, 5 and 10. Therefore, it 
shows that the DRM structure work well in its extensions to deal with multiple failure 
scenarios. 
        In conclusion, it can be seen that, the capacity usage in each link and the information 
about the relationship between working and protection capacity can be well captured by the 
DRM framework in a distributed manner. We highlight that, in the DRM, the essential 
information on the links traversed by the working path for a traffic demand needs to be 
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known by its protection links. Therefore, for a traffic demand between specific source and 
destination nodes, a route searching message needs to memorize the links traversed in its 
working path, and then delivers this information to update the local T_Link_l matrix entries 
of each link in its corresponding protection path as well as uploading the updated capacity 
usage information for exchange. This sort of distributed signaling needs to be implemented 
by a special distributed control mechanism. In the next chapter, we propose a Friend-or- Foe 
Resilient (FoF-R) ant-based routing algorithm to implement it and also can jointly optimize 
the working and protection paths routing problem. We shall describe how the heuristic FoF-
R ant algorithm with the DRM structure can find the optimal protection cycles and also 
explore the capacity sharing potential among protection paths in the network. 
3.4 Summary 
 
In this chapter, we developed a novel and comprehensive distributed framework, called 
DRM, to capture the dependency between the working and protection capacity. We have 
specified the information to be maintained as well as how it is updated and exchanged 
through distributed signaling. We highlighted that, in the DRM structure, the essential 
information on the links traversed by the corresponding working path needs to be known to 
the links in its protection path. This information exchange needs to be implemented by a 
special distributed signaling mechanism.  
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Chapter 4 
FoF-R Ant-based Routing 
Algorithm 
 
Telecommunication networks should be designed to be robust and to meet the capacity 
allocation related resilience requirements, so as to provide uninterrupted communication 
services in the case of failures. Moreover, providing high resiliency and maintaining QoS 
attributes is very costly in terms of the extra required transmission, switching and routing 
facilities. Hence, it is critical that the resiliency (or hence cost) of a network, be tailored to 
meet strict budget requirements. In this chapter, our objective is to develop a survivable 
routing algorithm to satisfy the requirements of network robustness, adaptability, and 
distributiveness while implementing the Distributed Resilience Matrix (DRM) framework 
introduced in Chapter 3 by an ant-based algorithm. This kind of heuristic approach is 
commonly known as emergent systems, swarm intelligence, or biologically inspired systems. 
The ant-based heuristic is specially introduced here to tackle the constrained multi-
commodity, multi-criteria SCA optimization problem for survivable routing. Different from 
the traditional ant algorithm, our novel Friend-or-Foe Resilient (FoF-R) ant-based routing 
algorithm with DRM framework is proposed to find the optimal protection cycle (i.e., two 
node disjoint paths between a source-destination node pair) and exploring the capacity 
sharing ability among protection paths using a capacity headroom-dependent attraction and 
repulsion function. 
       The remainder of this chapter is organized as below. First, we introduce the basics of 
swarm intelligence and ant colony optimization (ACO). The previous successful ant-based 
algorithms for routing and load balancing e.g., AntNet and Multiple Ant Colony 
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Optimizations (MACO) are also reviewed. The FoF-R ant-based routing algorithm is 
presented. Simulation results based on the OMNeT++ tool show that the FoF-R scheme with 
the DRM is a promising approach to solve the SCA problem for survivable routing and it 
gives a good tradeoff between a solution’s optimality and the time needed for finding a 
solution. 
4.1 Introduction on Ant Colony Optimization  
Research in ethnology suggests that self-organization is an important component of many 
collective phenomena in a society of insects [61-65]. The theory of self-organization was 
developed originally in the context of physics and chemistry, and can be extended to social 
insects to show that complex collective behaviour may emerge from interactions among 
individuals that exhibit simple behavior. A swarm intelligence system defined in [66] is 
based on the algorithms or distributed problem-solving devices inspired by the collective 
behaviour of social insect colonies or other animal societies. It is generally understood to be 
the result of overall behaviour generated by many simple behaviors interacting in some way. 
Emergent behaviour is not easily deductible from a description of the simple behaviors 
generating it. For example, ant-colonies, a typical social insect society, can be considered as 
a distributed system and in spite of the simplicity of each individual, ant-colonies present a 
highly structured self-organization. Ant-colonies can accomplish complex tasks that in some 
cases far exceed the individual capacity of a single ant. An illustration of the collective 
foraging behaviour of many ant species is the finding shortest path experiment [64, 67] as 
shown in Figure 4.1 below. 
 
Figure 4.1 Finding the shortest path around an obstacle 
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        Figure 4.1 illustrates how ants can reroute a trail around an obstacle which suddenly 
appears and find a shorter path to the food source. In this experiment, a food source is 
separated from the nest by a sudden obstacle (i.e., a cone). It is observed that in most 
experiments, the shorter path (up one) is selected by the colony if the down path is 
sufficiently longer. This is because these ants have a trail-following behavior: an individual 
ant lays a chemical substance, called a pheromone, which attracts other ants. The ants which 
took the shorter path (i.e., up one) returning to the nest will be faster, and influence the 
outgoing ants toward that shorter path, which becomes marked more and more strong. 
Therefore, this ant’s foraging behaviour is able to find the optimal shortest path. Four 
fundamental processes operated in this biological ant-based system are:  
• A large number of ants try simultaneously and asynchronously to move themselves 
from the nest to the food source;  
• Communication is indirect between the ants, i.e. they leave chemical trails of 
messages i.e., pheromones on the ground. All ants can smell each others’ 
pheromone;  
• A stochastic process can be used to model the navigational behaviour of an ant. By 
combining information about the neighbourhood, e.g. placement of a nearby obstacle 
like the cone, and the distribution of pheromone on the ground, ant movement is 
ruled by a probability distribution. A selection from the distribution produces a 
directional vector, which controls the ant’s forward movement. The higher 
pheromone intensities associate with higher probabilities of selection on specific 
path, thus the likelihood of following a trail used by many ants is higher than 
exploring a new route;  
• The search is iterative. Ants move along the same or similar trail again and again, 
which are continuously updating the pheromone levels on the ground.  
        From the ant foraging experiment described above, we can extract three main 
properties, which are relevant to the network resiliency context and thus inspire us to develop 
the new FoF-R ant-based survivable routing algorithm:  
 
• Adaptiveness: The simple behaviour typically handles unexpected responses from 
interactions with the environment. Such mechanisms often include a stochastic 
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component, i.e. by a random choice, a response is decided in one of a set of possible 
ways; 
• Robustness: Weak inter-component dependencies reduce the probability of system 
breakdown due to individual component failures. This is ensured by lack of 
synchronized hierarchical control and use of asynchronous indirect communication 
by changing the environment. Redundancy further reduces the probability of system 
breakdown due to individual component failures.  
• Efficiency: When encountered with complex problems, e.g. problems of the NP 
classes, emergent systems tend to find near optimal solutions with great efficiency. 
Reasons for this efficiency can be traced to the interplay of positive and negative 
feedback mechanisms and the stochastic (adaptive) mechanisms mentioned.  
4.1.1 Ant Colony Optimization   
Inspired by intelligence obtained from the ant colony’s foraging behavior, the Ant Colony 
Optimization (ACO), a new meta-heuristic for optimization has been proposed in [68-69]. 
This meta-heuristic has been applied to classical optimization problems, such as the traveling 
salesman problem [70], the quadratic assignment problem [71] and the job-shop scheduling 
problem with great success. This method, as a general heuristic, can be compared with 
simulated annealing [72]. Some ant-based optimization methods extended from the original 
method have been applied to the vehicle routing problem [73], graph colouring problem [74] 
and search of continuous spaces [75].   
        In ACO algorithms, a finite size colony of artificial ants collectively searches for good 
quality solutions to the optimization problem. Each ant builds a solution, or a component of 
it, starting from an initial state selected according to the problem dependent criteria. When 
building its own solution, each ant collects information on the problem characteristics and on 
its own performance, and uses this information to modify the representation of the problem, 
as seen by the other ants. Ants act concurrently and use indirect communication. An 
incremental constructive approach is used by the ants to search for a feasible solution. A 
solution is expressed as a minimum cost (or shortest) path through the states of the problem 
in accordance with the problem’s constraints. The complexity of each ant is such that even a 
single ant is able to find a (probably poor quality) solution. High quality solutions are only 
found as the emergent result of the global cooperation among all the agents of the colony 
concurrently building different solutions. Each ant builds a solution by moving through a 
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(finite) sequence of neighbour states. Movements are selected by applying stochastic local 
search policy directed by: 
• ant individual information (the ant internal state, or memory);  
• publicly available pheromone trail  
• a priori problem-specific local information.  
        Moreover, the releasing of pheromone depends on the characteristics of the problem. 
Ants can release pheromone while building the solution, or after a solution has been built, 
moving back to all the visited states. The autocatalysis plays an important role in ACO 
algorithms: the more ants choose a move, the more the move is rewarded by adding 
pheromone and thus more attractive it becomes for the next ant. In general, the amount of 
pheromone deposited is made proportional to the goodness of the solution an ant has built or 
is building. In this way, if a move contributed to generate a high-quality solution, its 
goodness will be increased proportionally to its contribution. A functional composition of the 
locally available pheromone and heuristic values define ant decision tables, that is, 
probabilistic tables used by the ants’ decision policy to direct their search towards the most 
attractive regions of the search space. The stochastic component of the movement choice 
decision policy and the pheromone evaporation mechanism avoid a rapid drift of all the ants 
toward the same part of the search space. Once an ant has accomplished its task, consisting 
of building a solution and depositing pheromone information, the ant dies and it will be 
deleted from the system.  
        The ACO algorithms, as a consequence of their concurrent and adaptive nature, are 
particularly suitable for distributed stochastic problems where the presence of exogenous 
sources determines a non-stationary in the problem representation in terms of costs and/or 
environment. More details about the ACO meta-heuristic, as well as of the class of problems 
to which it can be applied, can be found in [76].  
4.1.2 ACO Algorithms for Network Routing  
Research shows that current network routing algorithms are not adequate to tackle the 
increasing complexity of modern wide-area networks [77]. Centralized algorithms have 
scalability problems; static algorithms have trouble on keeping up-to-date with network 
changes; and other distributed and dynamic algorithms have oscillations and stability 
problems. Mobile agents are a promising technique for network routing and management 
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[78-79] as well as a novel way of building distributed software systems [80]. Unlike 
traditional stationary algorithms, mobile agents are small packets that can move themselves 
from node to node, cooperate with others to perform complex tasks in a distributed manner. 
These agents explore and collaborate in a network, collect routing information and update 
nodes’ routing tables, such as a routing path can be determined for data transmission.  
        A number of ant-based routing algorithms have been proposed. The most celebrated one 
is AntNet [81, 90], an adaptive agent-based routing algorithm that has outperformed the best-
known routing algorithms on several packet-switched communication networks. It was given 
another interesting example using a variation of swarm routing based on Bellman’s principle 
of dynamic routing in [82]. In addition, there are a number of ant-based routing algorithms 
for mobile and ad hoc networks e.g., in [83-88]. Extensive results of ant-based routing in 
communication networks have shown that this approach is very flexible and can achieve 
good performance in comparison with conventional routing methods.  
        In [89] Schoonderwoerd et al have developed an ant-based system for call routing in 
telecommunication networks which mimics, to some degree, the biological systems 
described above. Ants are implemented as mobile agents and pheromones as probabilities in 
matrices. A separate matrix is generated for each relevant source and destination pair, e.g. 
the matrix odtp  in Figure 4.2 represents pheromones “pointing” from the nest “o” towards 
the food source “d.” 
 
Figure 4.2 Probability matrix at time t from the obstacle scenario 
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        The probability matrix is relevant for an agent moving from the nest o=1 towards the 
food source d=4 at time t, which is applying the resulting probability matrices as the routing 
table for packets (or connections) routing in a network. Symmetric traffic conditions are 
assumed, i.e. delays experienced by agents moving forward must be representative for the 
traffic flowing in the opposite direction. 
        The AntNet [90] has been introduced to handle asymmetric traffic conditions. In this 
new system, an ant-like agent performs a search for a path in two phases. During the first 
phase, the forward phase, the agent only reads probabilities (i.e., smells pheromones) and 
navigates according to the processes described above. When reaching the destination node, 
the path quality is calculated and a reinforcement value r estimated. During the second 
phase, agent backtracks along the path found to the source node. When moving from node j 
to node i, the probability
,
od
t ijp  of matrix 
od
tp pointing forwards from source node “o ”towards 
destination node “d” of the path is updated in the same manner as described above. They 
also show that their AntNet system can produce routing tables of high quality. When packets 
in a packet switched network are routed stochastically using the probability tables generated 
by AntNet, efficient load balancing and low delays are achievable. Fast route reconfiguration 
is also provided when network topology changes occur. 
        In the AntNet algorithm, routing is determined by means of interactions of forward and 
backward network exploration agents (i.e., ants). The idea of using two-way agents is that 
the backward ants utilize the useful information gathered by the forward ants on their trip 
from source to destination. Based on this principle, no node routing updates are performed 
by the forward ants. Their only purpose in life is to report network delay conditions to the 
backward ants, in the form of trip times between each network node. The backward ants 
inherit this raw data and use it to update the routing table of the nodes. The entries of the 
routing table are probabilities, and as such, must sum to 1 for each row of the network. These 
probabilities serve a dual purpose:  
• the exploration agents of the network use them to decide the next hop to a 
destination, randomly selecting among all candidates based on the routing table 
probabilities for a specific destination; 
• the data packets deterministically select the path with the highest probability for the 
next hop.  
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        The AntNet algorithm works as follows:  
• Each network node launches forward ants to all destinations in regular time intervals;  
• The ant finds a path to the destination randomly based on the current routing tables;  
• The forward ant creates a stack, pushing in trip times for every node as that node is 
reached;  
• When the destination is reached, the backward ant inherits the stack; 
• The backward ant pops the stack entries and follows the path in reverse; 
• The node tables of each visited node are updated based on the trip times.  
        All of the ant-based algorithm introduced above have addressed the problem of routing 
but not load balancing. Only one probabilistic routing table is maintained in each node. 
Consequently, if there is more than one optimal path, then it will be more likely for all data 
traffics to be directed into only one of the optimal paths. One of the possible solutions is to 
maintain multiple probabilistic routing tables in a node. An ongoing work has addressed this 
issue under the topic of multiple ant colony optimizations [91-94]. In these studies, more 
than one colony of ants is used to search for optimal paths, and each colony of ants deposits a 
different type of pheromone represented by a different colour. Although ants in each colony 
respond to pheromone from its own colony, it is augmented with a repulsion mechanism that 
prevents ants associated with different colonies from choosing the same optimal path. 
        Some research work in [93] has adopted ACO to solve problems in virtual wavelength 
path routing and wavelength allocations. The distinguishing feature of the three variants of 
their ACO algorithms is that ants are not only attracted by the pheromones of other ants in 
their own colonies, but they are also repelled by the pheromones of other colonies. The 
motivation of their work stems from the fact that virtual wavelength paths can only carry a 
limited number of different wavelengths because of technological limitations and cost 
implications. In the virtual wavelength path routing, the problem is to allocate the minimum 
number of wavelengths for each link by evenly distributing the wavelength requirements 
over different links, while at the same time keeping the path lengths short (e.g., in terms of 
hop numbers). While pheromone attraction is used in the similar sense as other routing 
applications of ACO, pheromone repulsion enhances the chance of distributing different 
wavelengths over different links.  
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4.2  FoF-R Ant-based Survivable Routing Algorithm   
As mentioned above, the ant-based routing algorithms developed so far have concentrated on 
the coordination behaviour between agents, and there has been little work put on exploring it 
for the SCA problem for survivable routing. Competitive behaviour for disjoint path finding 
was developed in [95-96]. The former introduces collaboration and competition strategy, 
known as Multiple Ants Colony Optimization System (MACO), by using ants with different 
types of pheromones: ants cooperate with others if pheromone is of the same type as their 
own, or they compete if pheromone is of a different type. In [96], a distributed routing 
algorithm based on the cross-entropy method is proposed. These studies only concentrated 
on disjoint path finding, and do not target the expose of spare capacity allocation 
optimization for survivable routing.  
        Inspired by these prior works, the shared path protection scheme in survivable routing 
could benefit significantly from a certain level of repulsive behaviour between agents. 
Therefore, we propose the Friend-or-Foe Resilient (FoF-R) ant-based routing algorithm, 
which is armed with an attraction and repulsion relationship function. Compared with the 
traditional ant algorithm, the FoF-R ant algorithm requires an ant agent that has an ability to 
identify the relationship to a previously laid pheromone, so as to decide what action to take: 
“friend” (i.e., attraction) or “foe” (i.e., repulsion). If “friend” is recognized, the idea is vivid: 
friends are attractive to each other to traverse the same protection path (PP) to maximize the 
capacity sharing. On the other hand, the recognition of “foe” makes the ants detest each 
other, which means they need to follow disjoint routes and thereby avoid overloading the 
protection path. The capacity headroom-dependent function (CHF) is introduced to model 
the Friend and Foe relationships.  
4.2.1 FoF-R Ant Agent 
FoF-R ant agent is proposed to discover a set of node-disjoint cycles between every node 
pair in the network, each cycle is composed of two node-disjoint paths. These cycles are 
always available and updated before the connection request arrives, thus we can easily select 
the best cycle among them for connection setup. This method can guarantee a small setup 
delay because these cycles already exist by the time of connection setup. Following the ant-
colony routing principle, the mobile agents can report to each network node the cycles with 
low cost to increase the network performance.  
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        In the FoF-R ant-based algorithm, the routing is determined by means of interactions of 
network exploration agents i.e., ants. The core idea of using ant agents to find a cycle which 
is formed by the node-disjoint working and protection paths is that the ants can deliver the 
essential information e.g., the link traversed and capacity usage in its working path from 
source to destination, to the links in its protection path from destination to source. This is 
quite different from the previous AntNet algorithm, in which the backward ant is actually 
tracking back to its working path only. Based on this finding cycle principle, the updating on 
the local T_link_l matrix for link l at each node and the exchanging of the essential capacity 
usage information between nodes in the DRM structure described in Chapter 3, can be 
implemented through these smart FoF-R moving ants.  
4.2.2 Capacity Headroom-dependent Function 
Let a traffic flow r be specified by its source-destination node pair (o, d) with capacity 
requirement
r
d . Let lW  denote the set of working paths that use link l and lP  is the set of 
protection paths that use link l. Let lC  denotes the total capacity of link l, 
W
lC  is the total 
working capacity used and PlC  is the spare capacity reserved in link l. Therefore, we have:  
                                 
l
W
l r
r
C d
∈
= ∑
W
and max{ },Pl rC d r= ∈ lP ,                      (4.1) 
        Where the values of WlC  and 
P
lC  can be easily obtained from the column summation in 
_ _T link l  matrix for link l in DRM structure. Thus, the capacity headroom of link l, 
denoted as hl, which is the ratio of the residual capacity to the total capacity in link l, can be 
calculated as:   
                                                   
( )1 , [0,1]
W P
l l
l l
l
C Ch h
C
+
= − ∈                      (4.2) 
        Therefore, the Capacity Headroom-dependent Function (CHF), denoted as ( )l lR h , is 
introduced to model the Friend and Foe relationships can be calculated as below. 
                                                   2
1( )l l l
l
R h a h b
h
= − ⋅ + ⋅                                 (4.3) 
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Figure 4.3 An example of ( )l lR h  
        Figure 4.3 shows an example curve of CHF, ( )l lR h , where a = b= 1. The parameters a, 
b are positive constants, with a representing the degree of attraction and b the degree of 
repulsion. The ( )l lR h  can model a trust degree from unbounded repulsion (i.e., indefinite 
link cost) as Foe relationship to a linear attraction (i.e., small link cost) as Friend relationship 
when the capacity headroom lh  increases. In other words, the ( )l lR h  is attractive i.e., 
la h− ⋅ dominates for large lh , or repulsive (i.e., 2/ lb h  dominates) for small lh , which is 
consistent with inter-individual attraction and repulsion phenomenon in biological swarms. 
We can adjust the (a, b) pair to specify the different trust degree in this relationship function. 
In addition, the ( )l lR h is used as the heuristic information contributed to the next-hop 
selection probability in routing table, which is introduced next.  
4.2.3 FoF-R Ant Routing Table Structure  
To support the dynamic route selection, in FoF-R ant-based algorithm, a node i with iN  
neighbours has a routing table 1,[ ] ,i ijd N j ijτ −= ∈T N  with N−1 rows and iN columns. 
Here N is the total number of network nodes, iN is the set of all the neighbour nodes of 
node i and iN  is the number of neighbour node of node i. Each row corresponds to a 
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destination node and each column corresponds to a neighbour node. The value τ ijd expresses 
the probability of selecting neighbour node j as the next hop when an ant moves toward its 
destination node d from node i. For each destination, the sum of all neighbours’ selection 
probabilities must be 1 to satisfy the normalized condition:  
                                                   1,   [1, 1] 
i
ijd
j
d Nτ
∈
= ∈ −∑
N
                              (4.4) 
 
.  
 
Figure 4.4  An example of routing table at node “a” in a simple network with 6 nodes 
         
An example of the routing table is shown in Figure 4.4. When a connection request occurs 
between source node “a” and destination node “f”, according to the selection probability in 
the routing table, node “d” will be selected as the next hop because 
, , , , , ,a d f a c f a b fτ τ τ> >  .  
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4.2.4 FoF-R Ant Routing Table Updating 
 
Figure 4.5 FoF-R ant’s routing table updating 
As shown in Figure 4.5, when an ant visits a node, it updates the entries in the routing table. 
For example, an ant moves from the source node “o” to destination node “d” following the 
route (o,…, i, j,…, d), it updates the entries corresponding to the source node “o” in the 
routing table of node i as follows: the probability of selecting neighbour j is increased while 
the probabilities of selecting other neighbours are decreased. We assume that an ant visits 
node i at time t, so the values for routing entries in time t+1 in node i are determined as the 
following :  
                                                      
, ,
, ,
( )( 1)
1
i j d r
i j d
r
t
t
τ δ
τ δ
+
+ =
+
                            (4.5) 
        For the other nodes that is different from the visited node j:   
                                           
, ,
, ,
( )( 1) , ,
1
i k d
i k d i
r
t
t k k jττ δ+ = ∀ ∈ ≠+ N                 (4.6) 
        Here, 
r
δ  is the reinforcement parameter and is derived from the data collected by the 
ant. In FoF-R ant-based routing algorithm, this parameter is calculated as:  
                                         (1 )        0 1
r p cδ α δ α δ α= ⋅ + − ⋅ ≤ ≤                       (4.7) 
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        where pδ  is the amount of pheromone corresponding to the path length and  cδ  is the 
amount of pheromone corresponding to the capacity usage information. In addition, we 
introduce a scalar parameter α  such that we can adjust the weight between pδ  and  cδ in 
r
δ . 
        The factor pδ  is derived from the length of the path that the ant has moved along. The 
shorter the path length, the bigger the pδ  value is, and vice versa. Note that the length p of a 
path between a source-destination node pair is always greater than or equal to the length of 
the shortest path between the source and the destination, denoted by minp hereafter, and as a 
reinforcement parameter, pδ  must be small as 0 1pδ< < . Thus, we compute pδ as follows:   
                                                   min,    
p
p e p p p
βδ − ⋅∆= ∆ = −                          (4.8) 
        where β  is a control parameter. Since the absolute value of path length varies 
significantly in a large network, using the length difference instead of the absolute length in 
determining the reinforcement parameter pδ  enables the pheromone updating process for all 
node pairs to be controlled by the same parameter β . The factor  cδ  is corresponding to the 
capacity usage information. The link with more free capacity has a larger value of cδ . 
Similar to pδ , cδ  should be a small value and 0 1cδ< < , we can calculate cδ  based on the 
CHF ( )l lR h  as described previously:  
                                    cδ = ( ) 1l lR heγ ⋅ − ……… ………  ………(4.9) 
        where γ  is another control parameter. Here ,α β and γ  are design parameters and can 
be adjusted to tune the system performance. The value of α weighs the importance of the 
capacity usage value with respect to the path length value. An ant’s decisions are therefore 
taken on the basis of a combination of a long-term learning process i.e., path length and an 
instantaneous heuristic i.e., link capacity usage. 
        Moreover, as an ant moves from a source to a destination, its next hop is determined 
stochastically: a neighbour is selected according to its selection probabilities in the routing 
table. This is the basic principle of ant colony optimization followed by our FoF-R ant 
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algorithm. As a result, FoF-R ant tends to discover the better path between a node pair in 
terms of path length and capacity usage along this path. In our algorithm, an ant is killed 
when it reaches its source node after a cycle finding procedure. An ant is also killed if its 
lifetime exceeds a predefined value TTL (Time-To-Live). Ant-based algorithms usually 
suffer from stagnation, in which an optimal path is found by ants so the pheromone for this 
path is recursively increased. In this case, too many ants concentrate on this optimal path, 
which prevents them from discovering other better paths when the network state changes. To 
avoid this “local optima” situation, a random exploration factor noiseP  is introduced in our 
FoF-R algorithm: at each node; the FoF-R ant selects its next hop randomly with an 
exploiting probability noiseP  and selects its next hop according to the routing table with 
probability 1- noiseP . The using of noiseP  allows ants to keep exploring for a better solution for 
a traffic request.  
        With support from the routing table and the ant’s foraging, path selection can be 
performed in a straightforward manner as described in all other ant-based algorithms: when a 
connection request arrives at the source node, the next hop will be determined by the node 
with the highest selection probability or a probability of noiseP  to choose a random node 
among all its neighbouring entries.  
4.2.5 FoF-R Routing Procedure 
 
Figure 4.6 FoF-R ant-based routing procedure 
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        The main behaviour of FoF-R ant agent is illustrated in Figure 4.6 above. Here we use 
Ant_W to denote FoF-R ant with working path search status, and Ant_P as FoF-R ant with 
protection path search status. Each FoF-R ant needs to carry a memory stack ( )o d o i→ →M  of 
data, where i refer to the ith visited node in its cyclic journey. Let iN  be set of neighbouring 
nodes outgoing from node i and ijdτ  be the probability that the ant jumps from node i to node 
j, ij ∈N .The FoF-R ant-based distributed routing procedure can be described as follows: 
 
START 
{  
    Initialization of Routing table and T_link_l: for each node i, the routing table is 
initialized with a uniform distribution and its _ _T link l for each adjacent link l is set as 
a 1xL matrix such as: 
                            
1
ijd
i
τ =
N
, ij∀ ∈N  and _ _  [1][ ] {0}L =T link l  
DO (in parallel) 
{  
STEP 1: In regular time intervals, each node “o” launches a FoF-R ant to a randomly 
chosen destination “d”, its mission status is set as Ant_W 
 
DO (in parallel, as each Ant_W) 
{ 
STEP 2: After visiting a node j, Ant_W pushes in its stack ( )o d o j→ →M  the 
information about the previously traversed link l and the time between its 
launching to its arriving at j. Ant_W selects the next node to visit in the 
following way:  
It decides a movement based on the routing table 1,[ ] ,i ijd N j ijτ −= ∈T N , 
or with a probability of noiseP  to choose a random node among its 
neighbours 
IF A loop is found  
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FoF-R ant pops from its stack all data for the loop nodes to avoid 
infinite loops 
                             END IF  
 
} WHILE jumping node j ≠ d 
 
STEP 3:  When arrives at the destination d, FoF-R ant changes its mission status to 
Ant_P  
 
DO (in parallel, as each Ant_P) 
{ 
In its return journey, FoF-R ant delivers the traversed links’ information into 
_ _T link l  in its protection path. We can obtain ( )l lR h  to calculate cδ and 
then 
r
δ to update routing table and also according to ijdτ to select the next hop j 
} WHILE (j ≠ o) 
 
STEP 4: The source node evaluates the goodness associated with each protection 
cycle found by the FoF-R ant, by using the following additive link cost function:  
 
                        
( , )
( , ) ( )l l
l cycle o d
L o d R h
∈
= ∑                                      (4.10) 
 
STEP 5: Update the routing table of each node visited in the best cycle, i.e., 
increasing the pheromone probabilities of links that cycle used and decrementing, by 
normalization, the other links’ pheromones.  
 
STEP 6: All the good protection cycles stored at the source node, are constantly 
updated, thus the source node can easily select the best quality cycle for each 
connection setup. 
     } END 
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4.3 Implementation of FoF-R on OMNeT++ 
4.3.1 Introduction to OMNeT++ 
OMNeT++ stands for Objective Modular Network Testbed in C++ in [97]. It is a discrete 
event simulation tool designed to simulate computer networks, multi-processors and other 
distributed systems associated with GUI simulation library debugging and tracing. Its 
applications can be extended to modeling other systems as well. It has become a popular 
network simulation tool in the scientific community as well as in industry over the years. A 
model network consists of “nodes” connected by “links”. The nodes representing blocks, 
entities, modules, etc, while the link representing channels, connections, etc. The structure of 
how fixed elements (i.e. nodes) in a network are interconnected together is called the 
topology. OMNeT++ uses the NEtwork Description (NED) language, thus allowing for a 
more user friendly and accessible environment for creation and editing. It has a human-
readable textual topology and also uses the same format as that of a graphical editor. 
OMNeT++ allows for the creation of a driver entity to build a network at run-time by 
program. One of the most important factors in any simulation is the programming language, 
which is C/C++ based. Since it possesses advantages and it is also freeware for the research 
community, we have selected the OMNeT++ simulator in our simulation studies 
4.3.2 FoF-R Ant Models 
The internal structure of each FoF-R network node implemented in OMNeT++ is illustrated 
in Figure 4.7.  
 
Figure 4.7 The FoF-R ant node structure 
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• Router is responsible for traffics queuing modeling and switching the FoF-R ant 
message and data traffic to other routers.  
• Data is the sub-module that generates and receives the data traffic and collects 
related statistical values.  
• Ant is the sub-module to handle the FoF-R ant agents e.g., ant generator and sink. It 
processes the FoF-R ant messages such as uploading and delivering link information 
and elapsed time into local node when an ant passing. 
• RoutingTable holds the routing information of the node. In our study, the routing 
information has the next hop probability values. 
• _ _T link l is the Distributed Resilience Matrix (DRM) database for recording the 
traversed links on the working and protection paths for each traffic flow, which is 
used to calculate next hop selection probability.  
4.3.3 FoF-R Ant Routing Parameter Setting 
As other ant-based routing algorithms, the FoF-R ant-based routing algorithm has a 
collection of parameters to be set. We need to mention that, in any ant-based algorithms, the 
space of possible parameter settings is huge. The most common way for parameter setting is 
resolved through experiments. The values used in the simulations reported here were those 
found to be best according to our experiments.  
        The way of setting the pheromone parametersα , β ,γ  , a and b can affect the total 
capacity performance of FoF-R routing algorithm. Here, β  is the parameter to adjust the 
weight of the path length on the amount of pheromone in equation (4.8), γ  is the parameter 
to adjust the emphasize the capacity usage on the amount of pheromone in equation (4.9) and 
α  is a scalar parameter to adjust the importance of path length versus capacity usage in the 
amount of increased pheromone in equation (4.7).  
        The bigger value of α  is, the more emphasis on the path length and on the increased 
amount of pheromone
r
δ . On the other hand, the smaller value of α  is, the more emphasis 
on the capacity usage weight and the increased amount of pheromone
r
δ . For example, if α  
= 1, a path with a shorter length is considered as a better solution regardless of its capacity 
usage. If α  = 0, the path with lower capacity usage is considered as a better routing solution 
regardless of its length. Moreover, for two paths that have their lengths that are nearly equal, 
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FoF-R solution will select the path with lower capacity usage. In our experiments, we 
reported that the value α = 0.3-0.4 is a good range for scalar parameter for FoF-R algorithm. 
        The selection of the values β  and γ  also depends on the setting of value
r
δ , which is 
the amount of adjusted pheromone. In fact, 
r
δ  will affect the performance and the stability 
of the ant-based algorithm. With a high value of 
r
δ , the pheromone value of a route may 
change too fast and thus cause an instability on performance, In contrast, a small value of 
r
δ  
make the pheromone value of a route change gradually, but we may need a large number of 
ants to update and increase the value of pheromone on a good route so that this route will 
become a good solution. Experiments show that the value of 
r
δ  should range between 0.05 
and 0.2.  The values of β  and γ  should be selected so that 
r
δ  ranges between 0.05 and 0.2. 
Because pδ and cδ  are summed with the scale factor α  and 1-α  in equation (4.7), we will 
select β  and γ  so that pδ and cδ take a value of around 0.2. In addition, the factors a and b 
used in Capacity Headroom-dependent Function ( )l lR h tune the degree of attraction force to 
repulsion force, we found that a=10b can give a good range to be used in FoF-R algorithm.  
        However, determining an optimum set of parameters (α, β, γ, a, b ) for FoF-R ant based 
routing algorithm to achieve the best performance remains an open problem, which deserves 
further research effort. 
         In addition, the values for other general ant-based parameters are set as below:  
• t∆ = 0.2 second, it is time interval between two consecutive ant generations 
• TTL=2*N, N is the number of nodes in the network, after which the ant is removed 
from the system 
• 
noiseP = 5% or 6%,  the exploration probability in the case of the ‘local optima’ 
condition 
4.4 Simulation Results  
 
The FoF-R ant routing algorithm with DRM structure have been investigated by simulation 
on a PC with Intel(R) Celeron(R) 1.70GHz, 504MB of RAM, using the OMNeT++ discrete 
event simulator. All ILP models used herein were implemented in AMPL Mathematical 
Programming Language version 11.1 [98] and solved using the CPLEX 11.1 Solver [99].  
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Figure 4.8 COST266 topology scenarios 
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Figure 4.9 JANOS-US-CA network 
        The simulations are carried out upon two master network topologies from the SNDlib 
[100], one is the COST266 network with 28nodes and 41links and another is the JANOS-
US-CA network with 39 nodes and 61 links. We have studied 12 versions of COST266 
topologies and 16 versions of JANOS-US-CA network. Figure 4.8 depicts two limiting cases 
considered in COST266 networks: the sparsest topology with 31 links (upper case) and the 
densest topology with 64 links (lower case). Similarly, Figure 4.9 depicts two limiting cases 
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in JANOS-US-CA networks: the sparsest topology with 46 links (upper case) and the densest 
topology with 91 links (lower case). Without loss of generality, we assume symmetrical 
traffic flows, i.e., one unit of traffic demand between any pair of nodes. The comparative 
studies have been performed between our FoF-R algorithm with other three benchmarking 
mechanisms, i.e., SBPP, p-cycle and dedicated protection (DP), in terms of total capacity 
requirements and calculation time. The ILP models for SBPP and p-cycle were introduced in 
Chapter 2. For the DP scheme, by its very nature, it does not require optimization in the 
strictest sense, and each result was obtained by routing each demand via the shortest path and 
the next shortest disjoint path, so that the primary working routing will be equivalent to the 
SBPP design.  
 
Table 4.1 Total capacity of four protection schemes in COST266 networks 
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Figure 4.10  Total capacity usage comparison for COST266 networks 
        Table 4.1 and Figure 4.10 show the total capacity used by the four different protection 
schemes versus the average nodal degree d . As the average nodal degree increases gradually 
from 2.214 to 4.571, the total capacity required for establishing restorable connections for all 
the requests decreases for all four protection schemes. The best total capacity allocation 
comes from the SBPP scheme in sparse networks i.e., when the average node degree is 
between 2.214 to 3.929, while p-cycle performs best in dense networks in which d  is greater 
than 4.143. The FoF-R scheme only uses 2% more capacity than SBPP in sparse networks 
and that of 5% more capacity than the p-cycle scheme in dense networks. DP provides no 
spare capacity sharing ability. Consequently, it gives the highest total capacity usage, 
generally exceeding the working capacity. It also suggests that the total capacity usage is 
dependent on the topological connectivity. All these four schemes tend to require less 
capacity when the network becoms denser. There are two possible reasons for the 
algorithm’s sensitivity to network connectivity. First, as the network connectivity increases, 
both the predetermined working and protection path-pairs become shorter, this leads to a 
decrease in both working and protection capacity. Second, the potential for capacity sharing 
among PPs is likely to increase as the network connectivity increases, which leads to a 
decrease in protection capacity. 
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Figure 4.11 Algorithm calculation time for COST266 networks 
        Figure 4.11 shows that the calculation times for the different protection schemes. FOF-
R is significantly different from the other three schemes. We can see that SBPP, p-cycle and 
DP find an optimal solution in hundreds of seconds with p-cycle always taking a longer time 
than SPBB, while FoF-R needs only in tens of seconds to find the near optimal solution. 
Thereby, it provides a good tradeoff between algorithm computation speed and capacity 
efficiency, especially in low-connectivity networks.  
        To validate our above findings, we conduct a similar comparative study based on a 
family of 16 topologies derived from the master JANOS-US-CA topology.  
Table 4.2 Total capacity of four protection schemes in JANOS-US-CA networks 
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Figure 4.12 Total capacity usage comparison for JANOS-US-CA networks 
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Figure 4.13 Algorithm calculation time for JANOS-US-CA network 
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       Table 4.2 and Figure 4.12 show that the total capacity used by the four different 
protection schemes versus the average nodal degree d  on the larger JANOS-US-CA 
topologies. As the average nodal degree d increases gradually from 2.359 to 4.667, the total 
capacity required for establishing restorable connections for all the requests decreases for all 
four protection schemes. The best total capacity allocation still comes from the SBPP scheme 
in sparse networks i.e., when the average node degree is d between 2.359 to 4.051, while p-
cycle performs best in dense networks in which d  is greater than 4.205. The FoF-R scheme 
is stable and continually approximates well the optimal solutions by SBPP, under a gap of 
5% to 9% at most. Therefore, it can be seen that, the FoF-R ant based algorithm can 
approximate the optimal solution well. In terms of the calculation time, as seen in Figure 
4.13, the FoF-R is significantly faster i.e., in the scale of tens of seconds, compared to the  
other three protections and the p-cycle scheme has the most sensitive relation between its 
calculation time and network connectivity. 
        Additionally, we have performed another comparative study only between SBPP and 
the FoF-R algorithm based on 10 different topologies from SNDlib, as shown in Figure 4.14 
below.  
 
 
Figure 4.14 10 reference networks 
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Table 4.3 Total capacity usage comparison for 10 topologies 
 
 
Figure 4.15 Total capacity usage vs. average nodal degree for 10 topologies 
        As shown in Table 4.3 and Figure 4.15, in terms of performance on total capacity, we 
found that the FoF-R ant based algorithm approximates well to the optimal solutions found 
by SBPP. While, we found that the average nodal degree metric does not work well to 
quantify the network connectivity, since there is no apparent correlation between the total 
capacity and average nodal degree. For example, there are around four significantly different 
solutions with average nodal degree about 3, i.e., 431 units in POLSKA network, 590 unit in 
NOBEL-US network, 1437 unit in NOBEL-GERMANY network and even 997 units in the 
ATLANTA network with the smallest average node degree of 2.93. The reason for that is 
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that the average nodal degree metric can only give a rough indication of network 
connectivity, without considering the shape and size of the network. Therefore, it is not 
critical to use this metric as a topological metric to measure network robustness. This finding 
becomes a strong driving force for us to explore a more accurate topological metric to 
quantify the network robustness and thus results in some novel findings presented in Chapter 
5. 
 
4.5 Summary 
 
In this chapter, we proposed a novel FoF-R ant-based routing algorithm to find the protection 
cycles and to explore the sharing potential among protection paths by using a Capacity 
Headroom Function (CHF), i.e., an attraction/repulsion relationship function. By using 
proactive ant mobile agents to continuously investigate the network capacity usage, and 
updating the DRMs at each node under a distributed control environment, our FoF-R 
algorithm showed good performance in trading off computational speed against capacity 
efficiency. 
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Chapter 5 
Utility of Algebraic 
Connectivity Metric in SCA 
 
 
Performance of survivable routing protocols, robustness of the network under failures and 
spare capacity allocation (SCA) depend crucially on the topology of the network. Network 
robustness can be characterized by the network topological connectivity, which expresses 
how well nodes are connected in a network. Most of publications in this area use the average 
nodal degree to reflect the effect of network connectivity in determining spare capacity 
allocation. Despite the wide adoption of the average nodal degree metric in such studies, we 
show that this metric is only a coarse indicator of how sparsely or densely connected a given 
topology is, and thus carries insufficient information on network topological structure. 
Furthermore, employing the average nodal degree for describing the network’s connectivity 
may lead to misleading findings. We introduce a more informative metric: algebraic 
connectivity, which is defined as the 2nd smallest eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix of a 
given topology in SCA. It is a more sensitive measure of network connectivity in a broader 
spectrum of graphs. It has desirable properties, such as the larger the algebraic connectivity is, 
the greater the number of node- and link-disjoint paths to choose from.  
        The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. First, we review the methods to 
quantify the network robustness and then introduce the definition of algebraic connectivity 
metric and its related properties. Extensive simulation studies are presented next to compare 
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the algebraic connectivity metric with average nodal degree metric. Finally, conclusions are 
drawn.  
5.1 Topological Measures of Network Robustness 
Knowledge of network topology is crucial for understanding and predicting the performance, 
robustness, and scalability of network protocols. Routing and searching in networks, 
robustness to random network failures and spare capacity allocation (SCA) strategies all 
depend on the topological characteristics of networks. The robustness of a network can 
usually be characterized by a topological measure. In this section, we shall elaborate on the 
basic topological measures such as graph metrics. A variety of measures in both the 
structural domain and the spectral domain have been proposed to capture different features of 
a network topology as well as to classify graphs. We refer to [101] for a quite extensive 
survey of graph metrics. The structural measures refer to those measures such as node degree 
and clustering coefficient that represent topological properties more directly compared to 
spectral measures, which always involve an eigenvalue computation.  
5.1.1 Structural Measures  
In general, topological measures are a function of the network topology G(N,L). The number 
of nodes N and the number of links L are mostly regarded as parameters of a network, not 
metrics. Many measures are highly correlated with the size of the network N and the number 
of Links L. The degree id of a node i in a network is the number of links that are incident 
upon the node i. The node degree is an important characteristic of a node e.g., it reflects the 
traffic capacity and the popularity of the node. In addition, the node degree distribution of a 
network, denoted as [ ]Pr D k= , expresses the fraction of nodes in the network with node 
degree k. In other words, it is the probability that a randomly chosen node has degree of k. 
The average nodal degree, denoted as d , is purely an average function of the number of 
nodes N and the number of links L.  
                                         
max
1
2[ ] [ ]
d
k
Ld E D k Pr D k
N
=
= = ⋅ = =∑                         (5.1) 
        where maxd is the maximum node degree in the network. 
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        The link density, denoted as p, is equal to the number of links L in the network divided 
by the maximal possible number of links that may exist in a network:   
                                      
2 ( )
( 1) 1
L E Dp
N N N
= =
− −
                                              (5.2) 
        The hopcount NH of a shortest path is the number of links contained in that path. The 
hopcount distribution [ ]NPr H k= is the histogram of the hopcount between all possible 
node pairs in the graph. The average [ ]NE H and the variance [ ]NVar H , sometimes can be 
used to characterize the hopcount distribution. The largest hopcount between any pair of 
nodes is also referred to as the diameter of a network. In addition, the node connectivity 
( )v G and the link connectivity ( )e G are the minimal number of nodes and links that have to 
be removed in order to disconnect a network. They seem natural quantifiers for robustness, 
but difficult to compute for large networks.  
        Among these structural metrics mentioned above, the average nodal degree d  is widely 
adopted to reflect the effect of the network connectivity on determining the amount of 
capacity allocation by most previous works [102-105]. Their simulation results have always 
shown how the total amount of working and spare capacity allocated to different network 
topologies varies according to their different average nodal degrees.     
5.1.2 Spectral Measures  
One of the main goals in graph theory is to deduce the principal properties and structure of a 
graph from its spectrum. The graph spectral analysis can be used to reveal the fundamental 
properties of a graph through geometric analytic and algebraic techniques. It has been shown 
that eigenvalues are closely related to almost all major invariants of a graph, linking one 
property to another [106].  
        Let G (N, L) be a network and N = N  is the number of nodes, where N is the set of 
nodes; and L = L , is the number of links, where L  denotes the set of links in the network. 
The network G can be represented by its adjacency matrix, A(G), which is the N x N matrix, 
whose (i, j)-th entry is “1” if node i is connected to node j, i.e., (i, j) ∈ L  , and 0 otherwise. 
The diagonal entries of A(G), are defined to be 0. Let D(G) be the N x N diagonal matrix 
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with entries
,i i id=D , where id  is the degree of the i-th node of G. The Laplacian matrix, 
Q(G), of the network G is defined as:  
                                                       −Q(G) = D(G) A(G)                                   (5.3) 
        The set of eigenvalues of the Laplacian matrix Q(G) for a given graph is called as the 
Laplacian spectrum of G. The second smallest eigenvalue 2λ  is known as the algebraic 
connectivity or Fiedler value in [107-108], denoted as 2 ( )a Gλ =  for simplicity. In previous 
works, the algebraic connectivity can be used to characterize network robustness regarding 
the following two dynamic processes: synchronization of dynamic processes at the nodes of 
a network and random walks on graphs. A network has a more robust synchronized state if 
the algebraic connectivity of the network is bigger. Random walks move and disseminate 
efficiently in topologies with large algebraic connectivity. In addition, the algebraic 
connectivity is also widely studied in various areas of mathematics, mainly in discrete 
mathematics and combinatorial optimization. In the following, we shall present some related 
mathematical results, which can reveal the topological implications of the algebraic 
connectivity and indicate the network robustness characteristic.  
5.2 The Algebraic Connectivity Metric ( )a G  
The algebraic connectivity ( )a G can characterize the robustness with respect to the 
topological connectivity of a network. It has been shown that the algebraic connectivity is 
only equal to zero if G is disconnected. In addition, the multiplicity of zero as an eigenvalue 
of the Laplacian matrix Q(G) is equal to the number of disconnected components of G. The 
network properties such as connectivity and cutsets have been studied in graph theory and a 
commonly agreed metric to reflect these properties is the algebraic connectivity. The higher 
the algebraic connectivity is, the more difficult it can be to be broken up into separate 
components.  
5.2.1 The Derivation of Algebraic Connectivity 
For the Laplacian matrix Q(G), an N-dimensional vector x

 is its eigenvector if there is a 
scalar λ , such that Q x

= λ x

. We denote λ  is an eigenvalue of Q(G ) corresponding to the 
eigenvector x

. By its definition, the Q(G) is a real symmetric and positive semi-definite 
matrix, thus all of its N eigenvalues are real and non-negative. Notice that the all-ones vector 
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is an eigenvector of any Laplacian matrix Q and its associated eigenvalue is 0. We shall 
focus on the second smallest eigenvalue, 2λ  of the Laplacian matrix and its associated 
eigenvector x

. Fiedler [109] named this eigenvalue 2λ  as the “algebraic connectivity of a 
graph”, and therefore, the algebraic connectivity 2λ  is also known as the Fiedler value and 
its associated eigenvector as the Fiedler vector. 
        The following properties of algebraic connectivity and its Fiedler vector play an 
important role in quantifying network robustness.  
• The algebraic connectivity ( )a G of a network is greater than zero if and only if the 
network is connected. 
• A Fiedler vector 1( , ..., )Nx x x=

satisfies:  
                                                          
1
0
N
i
i
x
=
=∑ ,                                                    (5.4) 
        Since all-ones vector is an eigenvector of the Laplacian matrix Q(G) and the 
eigenvectors of a symmetric matrix are orthogonal. The Laplacian matrix Q(G) has N 
nonnegative real eigenvalues: 
                                                     1 20 ( ) Na Gλ λ λ= ≤ = ≤ ⋅⋅⋅                               (5.5) 
        It can be seen that, 0 is always an eigenvalue of Q(G), and that  1 (1,1,...1)T= is the 
corresponding eigenvector. Since Q(G) is a symmetric matrix, then the Rayleigh quotient of 
x

 with respect to Q(G) [107] is:   
                                                                     
( )T
T
x Q G x
x x
 
 
                                         (5.6) 
        Thus, the algebraic connectivity 2λ of the network G satisfies:  
                                                          
( )1,1,...,2 1
( )
min
T
T
x
x Q G x
x x
λ
⊥
=

 
 
                               (5.7) 
         In equation (5.7), the minimum value of 2λ  occurrs only when x

 is the Fiedler vector. 
For any vector Nx R∈

, we have:  
                                                     
2
( , )
( )T i j
i j
x x x x
∈
= −∑
 
Q(G)
L
                             (5.8) 
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          We denote the standard norm of a vector x

 in Euclidean space by Tx x x=

 and the 
algebraic connectivity metric 2λ  can be calculated from the following lemma.  
Lemma 5-1 Let G=(N,L) be a given network. Then 2λ , the algebraic connectivity of G, is 
give by:  
                                                       
2
( , )
2 2
1
min i ji j
N
ii
x x
x
λ ∈
=
−
=
∑
∑
 

L
                        (5.9) 
        Where the minimum is taken over the vectors { }1...... NNx x R⊂   such that
1
0
N
i
i
x
=
=∑
 
, 
and the 0

 denotes the all-zeros vector. The magnitude of this value 2λ  reflects how well 
connected the overall network G is.  
5.2.2 The Relations between ( )a G , ( )e G and ( )v G  
We recall two traditional concepts in network connectivity:  
• link connectivity ( )e G ,which is defined as the minimal number of links whose removal 
would result in losing connectivity of the network G; 
• node connectivity ( )v G , which is defined as the minimal number of nodes together with 
adjacent links whose removal would result in losing connectivity of network G. 
        The algebraic connectivity ( )a G is upper bounded by these two metrics and is 
illustrated to be a better robustness measure metric in [108]. In an incomplete graph, they 
have the following relations:   
                                 min( ) ( ) ( ) ( )a G v G e G d G≤ ≤ ≤                        (5.10) 
        The algebraic connectivity ( )a G is a more useful robustness measure with respect to the 
network connectivity than the node and link connectivity. Unlike the traditional connectivity, 
the algebraic connectivity is dependent on the number of nodes, as well as the way in which 
nodes are connected. The node connectivity ( )v G is always no smaller than the link 
connectivity ( )e G , since deleting one node incident on each link in a cutset succeeds in 
disconnecting the network. Of course, smaller node subsets may be possible. The minimum 
node degree in network, denoted as min ( )d G , is an upper bound on both the link and node 
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connectivity, since deleting all its neighbours (i.e., the links to all its neighbours) disconnects 
the network into one big and one single-node component. 
 
5.2.3 Graph Partitioning 
In addition to the relations to the intuitive node and link connectivity, the algebraic 
connectivity 2λ of a network is also closely linked to the cutset from the aspect of graph 
partitioning. It has been proved that networks with smaller algebraic connectivity have a 
better ratio cut [109-110]. A corollary of an extension of their work in [111] has 
demonstrated that one can obtain a good ratio cut from any vector with small Rayleigh 
quotient that is perpendicular to the all-ones’ vector. Thus, the algebraic connectivity 2λ  
tells how well we can cut a graph. A cut of a graph is a division of its nodes into two sets, S 
and S . We usually want to find that cut that has few links as possible. We let  (S,S )L  
denote the set of links whose nodes lie on opposite sides of the cut. We then define the ratio 
of the cut to be: 
                                                              
( , )
( )
min( , )
E S S
S
S S
φ =                                    (5.11) 
        The best cut is the one of minimum ratio, and its quality is the isoperimetric number 
( )Gφ of a graph [107]:  
                                                                     ( ) min ( )
S
G Sφ φ=                                  (5.12) 
 
        The Cheeger’s inequality shows that the isoperimetric number ( )Gφ is intimately 
related to 2λ  as:  
                                                                      
2
2 2
φφ λ≥ ≥
∆
                                       (5.13) 
        where ∆  is an upper bound on the node degree in the network. By Cheeger’s inequality, 
2λ  gives an indication to how to quantify the network connectivity. If 2λ  is small, then it is 
possible to cut the network into two pieces without cutting too many links. If 2λ  is large, 
then every cut of the network must cut many links.  
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5.3 Properties of Algebraic Connectivity 
In this section, we will introduce some linear properties of the algebraic connectivity, ( )a G  , 
which is related to measure the network topological robustness.  
Lemma 5-2 If 1G , 2G are link-disjoint networks with the same set of nodes then:   
                                                    1 2 1 2( ) ( )a G G a G G+ ≤ ∪                                    (5.14) 
Proof. We denote X as the set of all column vectors x such that 1Tx x = , since 
1 2 1 2( ) ( ) ( )Q G G Q G Q G∪ = + , thus:    
1 2 1 2( ) min( ( ) ( ) )T T
x X
a G G x Q G x x Q G x
∈
∪ = +
1 2 1 2min ( ) min ( ) ( ) ( )T T
x X x X
x Q G x x Q G x a G a G
∈ ∈
≥ + = +  
        Corollary, the function ( )a G is non-decreasing for networks with the same set of nodes, 
and we have:    
                                 1 2( ) ( )a G a G≤ , if 1 2G G⊆                                 (5.15) 
        where 1G , 2G  have the same set of nodes. 
Lemma 5-3 Let G be a given network, and 1G arises from G by removing k nodes from G 
and all adjacent links then:  
                                            1( ) ( )a G a G k≥ −                                      (5.16) 
Proof. Let G have N nodes and let 1G  arise from G by removing one node, say, define a new 
network G’ by completing in G all missing links from deleted node, then:   
' 1( ) ,   ( )
,               1
TQ G I eQ G
e N
 + −
=  
− − 
 
        Let x

be an eigenvector corresponding to the eigenvalue, 
since ( )' 1( ) [ 1]0 0
x xQ G a G   = +   
   
 
, then 1( ) 1a G + is an eigenvalue of '( )Q G different from 
                                                                                                                                               95 
  
zero, i.e., 1( ') ( ) 1a G a G≤ + .By equation (5.15), 1( ') ( )a G a G≤ , which implies equation 
(5.16) for k=1. The general case follows by induction. 
5.4 The Mean Distance 
In [107], it has been shown that the algebraic connectivity 2λ is also closely related to some 
other graph invariants. One of the most interesting connections is its relation to the mean 
distance, ( )Gρ of graphs. The mean distance is equal to the average of all distances between 
distinct nodes of the graph. In some sense, this metric can measure the size and shape of the 
graph. In [112], some bounds on the mean distance ( )Gρ are derived. Its lower bound is: 
                 
2
2 2( 1) ( )
2
NN Gρ λ
−
− ≥ +                                      (5.17) 
        and its upper bound is:  
              
2
2
1( ) ln( 1)
1 4 2
NG N
N
λρ λ
  ∆ +
≤ − +   
−   
                     (5.18) 
        Here G is a given network with N nodes, 2 ( )a Gλ = , is the algebraic connectivity of the 
network, ( )G∆ = ∆ is the maximal node degree. This information provided by the network 
mean distance ( )Gρ , is very useful to be considered when we comparing different network 
topologies in our later simulation work.  
        According to the above properties of algebraic connectivity metric, we can use this 
metric to measure the importance of a node or a link, because the larger the algebraic 
connectivity of a network is, the more connected the network will be. Thus, the topological 
connectivity of the remaining network can be quantified by the algebraic connectivity of the 
network resulting from removing that particular node and all the links connected to that node 
from the original network. In this way, the node or link that causes a more severe reduction 
in the remaining algebraic network connectivity has higher importance and should need more 
protection. In addition, we can also compare the effects of algebraic connectivity metric vs. 
average nodal degree metric, in terms of the performance on the total capacity allocated for 
different topologies. Therefore, we can propose a principle that both working and spare 
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capacity allocations benefit mostly from adding some critical nodes and links to maximize 
the algebraic connectivity of a current network.  
5.5 Experimental Results 
 
We have performed the following four experiments to investigate the effects of the 
topological metrics, i.e., algebraic connectivity vs. average nodal degree on spare capacity 
allocation. 
5.5.1 Successive Deletion of Nodes  
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 COST266 Network 
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Figure 5.2 JANOS-US-CA Network 
        In the first experiment, two master network topologies from the SNDlib are considered. 
The first one is the COST266 network, see Figure 5.1. This network contains 28 nodes and 
41 bidirectional links. The second network is JANOS-US-CA, as shown in Figure 5.2, which 
is based on the North-American Network with 39 nodes and 61 bidirectional links. The 
SBPP ILP model is solved using AMPL/CPLEX 11.1 on a PC with Intel(R) Celeron(R) 
1.70GHz, 504MB of RAM.  
        Firstly, we investigate how the importance of each node affects the total capacity 
allocated. Simulations were conducted on two families of network topologies derived from 
the above two master networks by deleting one node each time, together with all of its 
adjacent links. Afterwards, we calculate the algebraic connectivity and average nodal degree 
of the remaining network. The SBPP algorithm is used to evaluate each topology alternative, 
to find the optimal total capacity. Here, we ignore some cases for which the SBPP cannot 
find feasible solutions since no node-disjoint paths exist for a traffic demand after the critical 
node has been deleted. For example, after deleting the “Oslo” node in Figure 5.1, its 
neighbouring nodes have only one adjacent link left, so there is no solution for the SBPP 
algorithm and it will be reported by the CPLEX solver. This is denoted as “impractical” in 
Total Capacity.  
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Table 5.1 Total capacity, algebraic connectivity and average nodal degree after deleting 
specific nodes in COST266 reference network 
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Table 5.2 Total capacity, algebraic connectivity and average nodal degree after deleting 
specific nodes in JANOS-US-CA reference network 
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Figure 5.3 Total capacity vs. average nodal degree after deleting specific nodes in COST266 
reference network 
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Figure 5.4  Total capacity vs algebraic connectivity after deleting specific nodes in COST266 
reference network 
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Figure 5.5  Total capacity vs. average nodal degree after deleting specific nodes in JANOS-
US-CA reference network 
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
0.0700 0.0750 0.0800 0.0850 0.0900 0.0950 0.1000 0.1050 0.1100 0.1150 0.1200
Algebraic Connectivity
To
ta
l C
ap
ac
ity
 
Figure 5.6 Total capacity vs. algebraic connectivity after deleting specific nodes in JANOS-
US-CA reference network 
        It can be seen that, the results on the optimal total capacity, average nodal degree and 
algebraic connectivity of the remaining network after deleting specific nodes in the two 
reference networks are listed in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. These results have been depicted in 
Figures 5.3 to 5.6 for showing how the total capacity varies with the average nodal degree 
and the algebraic connectivity, respectively. It is evident that total capacity is more strongly 
correlated with the algebraic connectivity than with the average nodal degree. There are two 
possible reasons for the SBPP algorithm’s sensitivity to network connectivity. Firstly, as the 
network connectivity increases, both the predetermined working and protection path-pairs 
become shorter. This leads to a decrease of both working and protection capacity. Secondly, 
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the potential for capacity sharing among protection paths is likely to increase as the network 
connectivity increases, and this leads to a further decrease of protection capacity 
        Looking at the results in detail, we can see almost linear dependence of the total 
capacity on the algebraic connectivity. By contrast, in the case of average nodal degree, its 
dependence on average nodal degree d is not monotonic. For example, in Figure 5.3, there 
are 7 different topologies with d =2.8148, while they have 7 different total capacities 
allocated ranging from 4572 to 5814 units. This shows that using of average nodal degree as 
a metric has a severe limitation as it is insensitive to the total capacity of a given topology. 
On the other hand, algebraic connectivity monotonically depends on total capacity of a given 
topological structure. We also can see that, if the traffic demands are uniform, the nodes in 
the core region e.g., Hamburg, Milan, Frankfurt and Munich, are more important than others, 
because they are more frequently being used by traffic flows. If any of these nodes is deleted, 
it will result in a severe reduction of algebraic connectivity. The similar phenomenon can be 
observed in the results obtained for JANOS-US-CA network: see Figures 5.5 and 5.6.   
5.5.2 Successive Deletion of Links  
Further experiments have been carried out to analyze the properties of the algebraic 
connectivity metric and average nodal degree taking into account only slightly modified 
topological scenarios. We investigate how the importance of each link affects the total 
capacity allocated. Following the similar mechanism mentioned above, simulations were 
conducted on two families of network topologies derived from our two reference networks 
by deleting one link at a time. Here, we ignore cases for which the SBPP cannot find 
practical solutions since no node-disjoint paths existed for a given traffic demand after the 
critical links have been deleted, e.g., if the link between Oslo and Stockholm is deleted, see 
Figure 5.1. The simulation results are shown in Tables 5.3 to 5.4 and Figures 5.7 to 5.8. 
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Table 5.3 Total capacity, algebraic connectivity and average nodal degree after deleting 
specific links in COST266 reference network 
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Table 5.4 Total capacity, algebraic connectivity and average nodal degree after deleting 
specific links in JANOS-US-CA reference network 
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Figure 5.7 Total capacity vs algebraic connectivity after deleting specific links in COST266 
reference network 
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Figure 5.8  Total capacity vs algebraic connectivity after deleting specific links in JANOS-
US-CA reference network 
 
        From the above results, it can be seen that the average nodal degree in two families of 
network topologies assumes constant value of d =2.8571 in COST 266 topologies with 40 
links, and the value of d =3.0769 in JANOS-US-CA topologies with 60 links, respectively, 
while the total capacity solutions are significantly different. There are 25 solutions, with the 
total capacity ranging from 4828 to 6110 units in COST266 scenarios, and 40 solutions with 
the total capacity ranging from 10093 to 13106 units in JANOS-US-CA scenarios. This 
shows again that the average nodal degree has a severe limitation as it is insensitive to 
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changes in total capacity caused by removal of single link. The algebraic connectivity 
remains sensitive to such changes. In addition, it can be seen that the links located in the 
network’s core region are more important than those at the network boundaries since they are 
more frequently used by the traffic flows. Thus, deleting them can cause severe decreases in 
network connectivity. 
 
5.5.3 Repositioning of Links 
 
Additionally, we investigated the impact of the algebraic connectivity metric and average 
nodal degree has on capacity allocation under links’ repositions scenario. Seven sample 
networks derived from the COST266 reference network by placing 4 links in different 
positions have been studied, see Figures 5.9 to 5.15 below.  
 
 
Figure 5.9 COST266-1 
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Figure 5.10 COST266-2 
 
 
Figure 5.11 COST266-3 
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Figure 5.12 COST266-4 
 
 
 
Figure 5.13 COST266-5 
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Figure 5.14 COST266-6 
 
 
Figure 5.15 COST266-7 
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Table 5.5 Total capacity vs. algebraic connectivity for link repositions in COST266 reference 
network 
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Figure 5.16  Total capacity vs algebraic connectivity for link repositions in COST266 
reference network 
        As shown in Table 5.5 and Figure 5.16, while all the seven derived topologies have the 
same average nodal degree, i.e., d  =2.9286, the resulting total capacity values are quite 
different for each of them. Note that total capacity decreases as algebraic connectivity 
increases. One can see that when four links are placed on the boundary of the network, see 
e.g., Figure 5.10 and 5.11, the total capacity is generally larger than deploying the links in 
the core region of the network, cf. Figures 5.14 and 5.15, because boundary links are less 
used in the SBPP solutions.          
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5.5.4 The Combined Metric 
2
ρ
λ  
In the previous three experiments, the comparative studies have been performed among the 
derived topologies from the same master topology and thus the topologies all look similar. In 
this case, we do not need to consider the size and shape of the topology and only the 
algebraic connectivity metric seems sufficient. In this experiment, by introducing the 
additional mean distance metric ρ  , which is also related to algebraic connectivity 2λ , we 
propose to compare different topologies, in terms of their size and shape.  We also calculate 
the exact mean distance as a reference to the upper bound on the mean distance predicted in 
equation (5.17) and (5.18).  We have selected 20 topology instances from the SNDlib, as 
shown in Figure 5.17 and their network information is listed in Table 6.  
 
 
Figure 5.17 20 referenced network topologies 
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       Table 5.6 Network Information for 20 referenced networks 
 
        We also recall the lower and upper bounds on mean distance in equation (5.17-18), such 
that:  
2
2 2
2 2 1( ) / ( 1) ln( 1)
2 1 4 2
n n
n n
n
λρλ λ
  ∆ +−
+ − ≤ ≤ − +   
−   
 
        Then we calculate the combined metric 
2
ρ
λ  to study its effects on the total capacity. 
Here we use two mean distance related parameters, one is the exact mean distance exactρ , 
which can be calculated by the standard graph toolbox in MATLAB and another is the 
estimated upper bound on the mean distance upρ .  
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Table 5.7 Total capacity vs. algebraic connectivity, exact mean distance and upper bound of 
mean distance for 20 reference networks 
 
 
Figure 5.18  Total capacity vs. average nodal degree 
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Figure 5.19  Total capacity vs. Exact mean distance/algebraic connectivity 
 
 
Figure 5.20  Total capacity vs. upper bound mean distance/algebraic connectivity 
 
        As shown in Table 5.7 and Figures 5.18 -5.20, it can be seen that, in Figure 5.18, there 
is no clear correlation between the total capacity and average nodal degree metric. For 
example, there are 7 network topologies have their average nodal degree about 3, but the 
total capacity solutions are significantly different and range from 431 units to 10412 units. 
As shown in Figures 19-20, we can find a monotonically increasing trend between the total 
capacity and mean distance related metric. In Figure 5.20, we found that, the total capacity 
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increases as the value of the combined metric 
2
upρ
λ  increases. When 2λ  is fixed, the total 
capacity increase as the upρ  increases, since as the mean distance becomes larger, more 
working and protection capacity need to be allocated. In addition, as upρ  is fixed, the total 
capacity decreases as the algebraic connectivity 2λ increases, since a larger 2λ  indicates 
denser connectivity and thus more capacity sharing can be achieved. Moreover, we can see 
that the combined metric 
2
upρ
λ , which can be easily derived from the second smallest 
eigenvalue 2λ , have a monotonic trend as similar as the
2
exactρ
λ , where exactρ  is more 
complex to be calculated. Therefore, we can conclude that the algebraic connectivity metric, 
2λ  , not only can indicate the network connectivity, but also can be used to estimate the 
mean distance of a network in a convenient way. 
 
5.6 Summary 
 
We introduced an algebraic connectivity metric, adopted from spectral graph theory, namely 
the 2nd smallest eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix of the network topology, as an 
alternative to the average nodal degree, to characterize network robustness in studies of the 
SCA problem. Extensive simulation studies confirmed that this metric is a more informative 
parameter than the average nodal degree for characterizing network topologies in 
survivability studies. In general, a larger algebraic connectivity means better network 
connectivity i.e., more node- and link-disjoint paths to choose from between node pairs, thus 
less network capacity would be allocated. Moreover, by considering the network mean 
distance characteristic, we can use a combined metric, 
2
ρ
λ , to quantify different sizes of 
topologies and find a monotonically increasing trend between the total capacity and the 
2
ρ
λ topological index.  
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion and Future work 
 
 
6.1 Contributions 
 
The main target of this dissertation was to provide an in-depth understanding of the 
fundamentals of the spare capacity allocation (SCA) problem for survivable routing and to 
contribute new ideas and techniques to the area of network resiliency. There are three main 
contributions in this dissertation:  
        Firstly, the relationship between working capacity and spare capacity in SCA problem 
was addressed in Chapter 2. We introduced a matrix-based structure, called the Distributed 
Resilience Matrix (DRM) that can capture complete information on capacity usage in a 
distributed manner.  
        Secondly, we proposed a novel FoF-R ant-based algorithm to find the protection cycles 
and to explore the sharing potential among protection paths by introducing the Capacity 
Headroom-dependent Function (CHF), an attraction/repulsion relationship function. By 
using the proactive ant mobile agents to continuously investigate the network capacity usage, 
and update the protection cycle tables and DRMs at each node in the distributed control 
environment, our FoF-R algorithm showed good performance in trading off computational 
speed against capacity efficiency. 
        Finally, the relationship between spare capacity allocation and topological connectivity 
metrics such as average nodal degree vs. algebraic connectivity was addressed in Chapter 5. 
We showed that the average nodal degree of a network is not sufficient on its own for 
quantifying the network robustness. We suggested using a more informative metric: the 
algebraic connectivity of the network, as it provides a better numerical characterization of a 
118 
given topology and its dependence on key network connectivity properties. In general, a 
larger algebraic connectivity means better network connectivity i.e., more node- and link-
disjoint paths exist that can be chosen from by pairs of communicating nodes, and so less 
network capacity needs to be allocated. It was also shown that there is a power law 
relationship between the total capacity and the algebraic connectivity metric. 
 
6.2 Future work 
 
Considering the work covered in this dissertation and the development of the future network, 
it would be useful to highlight some future areas of investigation.  
        The traffic scenario was assumed to be uniform for simplicity, hence more complex 
traffic scenarios should be used in future work. 
        Work on improving the effectiveness of the relationship function in the FoF-R 
algorithm should be explored. The algorithm should be improved or enhanced and verified in 
various other topologies and traffic scenarios. In addition, extension of the FoF-R routing 
algorithm to handle multiple failures and differentiated resilience requirements in a multi-
service NGN environment would be a promising research direction. 
        More extensive studies on how the algebraic connectivity affects the amount of spare 
capacity to be allocated in more complex topologies are need, especially in different types of 
topology. Furthermore, capacitated versions of networks need to be studied, taking into 
account the fact that the network may have existing link capacities and/or link capacity limits 
to be respected with different traffic scenarios.   
        Further research work involving network topology design can investigate the following 
problems:   
• Generation: can we efficiently generate ensembles of random but realistic 
topologies by replicating a set of simple graph metrics?      
• Evolution: what are the forces driving the evolution (growth) of the topology of a 
given network?  
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